G.R. No. 121916 June 26, 1998
RENE KNECHT and CRISTINA DE KNECHT, petitioners, vs. HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, as OMBUDSMAN; HON. JEJOMAR BINAY, as Mayor of Makati City; HON. PABLO CUNETA, as Mayor of Pasay City; HON. MANUEL JAMES RATERTA, as Solicitor, Office of the Solicitor General; ENGR. JESUS REYNA, as City Engineer of Pasay City; ATTY. PEPITO ABAD, as Chief of Civil Security Unit, Pasay City; RONALDO E. LAMPITOC, JR., as Deputy Sheriff of MTC, Branch 46, Pasay City; LUIS LASA, as Deputy Sheriff of RTC, Branch 111, Pasay City; and MARIANO NOCOM, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioners Rene Knecht and Cristina de Knecht filed a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman against the respondents for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019. They alleged that from August 30 to September 5, 1990, the respondents, conspiring with each other, caused the demolition of their seven houses in Pasay City with the aid of policemen, over their objection and with the use of force. They claimed this caused them undue injury through manifest partiality, gross inexcusable negligence, or evident bad faith, as there was no writ of demolition authorizing the demolition, but only a writ of possession issued by Judge Sofronio Sayo, and it was done without notice to them while they were in adverse possession.
The properties were subject to expropriation proceedings under B.P. Blg. 340. The Republic of the Philippines had filed an Amended Petition for Determination of Just Compensation and was granted a Writ of Possession by the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City on August 29, 1990, after making the required deposit. The writ commanded the sheriff to place the Republic in possession of the expropriated properties, including the power of demolition if necessary. The Republic took possession, and the houses were demolished.
The Ombudsman, through Hon. Conrado M. Vasquez, dismissed the complaint on March 30, 1994, for lack of evidence. The Ombudsman reasoned that at the time of demolition, the petitioners had no colorable title to the properties as their claim had been foreclosed by judicial action in the expropriation case. The Ombudsman found that the demolition was carried out based on a valid writ of possession, and the absence of a separate writ of demolition did not make the respondents indictable, as a writ of demolition is a complement to a writ of possession to effect full delivery. The Ombudsman also noted the need for decisive action to avert further delay in the EDSA Extension project. Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied on June 3, 1995.
Petitioners then filed the present petition for mandamus under Rule 65, seeking to compel the Ombudsman to proceed with a preliminary investigation and file the corresponding information in court. They argued the Ombudsman gravely abused his discretion by dismissing the complaint without requiring counter-affidavits from the respondents and by erroneously concluding that a writ of demolition was unnecessary.

ISSUE

Whether the writ of mandamus may be issued to compel the Office of the Ombudsman to conduct a preliminary investigation and file an information against the respondents for alleged violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019.

RULING

No, the petition for mandamus is dismissed. The Supreme Court held that mandamus lies to compel the performance of a ministerial duty, not a discretionary duty. The duty of the Ombudsman to conduct a preliminary investigation is discretionary, not ministerial. Under Section 2, Rule II of Administrative Order No. 07 (Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman), the investigating officer, upon evaluating a complaint, may recommend its outright dismissal for want of palpable merit, among other options. This finds support in Section 3(b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, which allows an investigating officer to dismiss a complaint if he finds no ground to continue the inquiry. Therefore, the investigating officer in this case acted within his authority in recommending dismissal without proceeding to a full preliminary investigation.
The Court further ruled that it cannot control or review the Ombudsman’s exercise of discretion in prosecuting or dismissing a complaint, as such initiative and independence are inherent in the Ombudsman’s constitutionally mandated investigatory and prosecutory powers. The Ombudsman’s finding that the respondents were clothed with a proper judicial writ (the writ of possession) and that the demolition was a necessary consequence to fully effect the writ, thereby finding no basis to indict for violation of R.A. 3019, was an exercise of this discretion which the Court will not disturb. The petition for mandamus, which seeks to control this discretion, is therefore not the proper remedy.