GR 121592; (July, 1996) (Digest)
G.R. No. 121592. July 5, 1996. ROLANDO P. DELA TORRE, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MARCIAL VILLANUEVA, respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Rolando P. Dela Torre was disqualified by the COMELEC from running for Mayor of Cavinti, Laguna in the May 1995 elections under Section 40(a) of the Local Government Code. The COMELEC found he had been convicted by final judgment in 1990 for violation of the Anti-Fencing Law (P.D. 1612). His conviction became final on January 18, 1991. The COMELEC ruled that fencing involves moral turpitude, constituting a ground for disqualification.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the grant of probation to him by the Municipal Trial Court on December 21, 1994, suspended the execution of the judgment and all its legal consequences, thereby rendering Section 40(a) inapplicable. The COMELEC denied his motion, prompting this petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion.
ISSUE
1. Whether the crime of fencing involves moral turpitude.
2. Whether a grant of probation affects the applicability of Section 40(a) of the Local Government Code.
RULING
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and affirmed the COMELEC resolutions. On the first issue, the Court held that fencing involves moral turpitude. Moral turpitude refers to an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity contrary to accepted rules of right and duty. While not every criminal act involves moral turpitude, the Court analyzed the elements of fencing under P.D. 1612. The third element—that the accused knows or should have known the items were derived from robbery or theft—is crucial. This knowledge demonstrates the same malicious intent to deprive owners of their rightful property as the crimes of robbery or theft, which are inherently immoral. Thus, fencing, by its nature, involves moral turpitude.
On the second issue, the Court ruled that probation does not remove the disqualification under Section 40(a). Probation only suspends the execution of the sentence; it does not annul the conviction, which remains final. The legal effect of a judgment of conviction attains finality upon application for probation. Therefore, petitioner’s disqualification, stemming from his final conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude, subsists unaffected by the grant of probation. The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying him.