GR 121517; (March, 2000) (Digest)
G.R. No. 121517; March 31, 2000
RAY U. VELASCO, JOSEYMOUR P. ECOBIZA, WILHELM BARLIS AND BERNABE ALABASTRO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, FIRMWOOD DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION AND STA. CLARA HOUSING INDUSTRIES, INC., respondents.
FACTS
This case originated from a separate civil action for delivery of personal property and damages filed by Firmwood Development Corporation (FIRMWOOD) against petitioners, including sheriffs and a lawyer. FIRMWOOD alleged that petitioners illegally seized eleven crates of plywood bearing its and Sta. Clara Housing Industries, Inc.’s (STA. CLARA) markings. The seizure was purportedly based on a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) issued by the Supreme Court in a related case, G.R. No. 79586, which enjoined the Diplomas and STA. CLARA from disposing of plywood inventory. Petitioners justified their act as enforcement of that TRO.
In the trial court, both FIRMWOOD and STA. CLARA (which intervened) filed motions for summary judgment. They argued there was no genuine issue of fact since STA. CLARA confirmed FIRMWOOD’s ownership of the plywood, and petitioners lacked legal authority for the seizure. The trial court granted summary judgment, ordering petitioners to return the plywood or pay its value, plus damages and attorney’s fees. The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision.
ISSUE
Whether the trial court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of the private respondents.
RULING
Yes, the Supreme Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment. Summary judgment is proper when, based on the pleadings, affidavits, and admissions, no genuine issue as to any material fact exists, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Here, the core factual issue was the ownership of the seized plywood. Petitioners’ Answer and Answer to the Complaint-in-Intervention merely denied FIRMWOOD’s ownership based on the allegation that STA. CLARA was the owner. However, STA. CLARA’s Complaint-in-Intervention expressly confirmed that the plywood was milled for and belonged to FIRMWOOD. This judicial admission by STA. CLARA, a party aligned with petitioners’ own theory of ownership, removed any genuine factual controversy regarding title.
On the legal issue of authority, the Supreme Court held the seizure was void. The TRO in G.R. No. 79586 was directed only at the Diplomas and STA. CLARA, prohibiting them from disposing of inventory. It did not authorize petitioners or any sheriff to seize property. The proper remedy for a perceived violation of a TRO is a contempt proceeding, not self-help through unauthorized seizure. Consequently, petitioners acted without legal authority, and the property was never lawfully in custodia legis. With no genuine issues of fact or law remaining, summary judgment was correctly rendered against petitioners.