GR 121213; (January, 2004) (Digest)
G.R. Nos. 121213 and 121216-23; January 13, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. BUTCHOY DE LA TORRE and FE DE LA TORRE, appellants.
FACTS
Appellant-spouses Butchoy and Fe de la Torre were convicted by the Regional Trial Court of nine counts of rape against their 16-year-old housemaid, Baby Jane Dagot. The prosecution evidence established that the series of rapes began in September 1992 in Tumarbong, Roxas, Palawan. In the initial incident, Fe woke Baby Jane and Butchoy at midnight while holding a scythe and a lamp. Fe forcibly positioned Baby Jane beside Butchoy, undressed them both, and ordered Butchoy to have sexual intercourse with the victim. Baby Jane objected and cried but was subdued by her fear of Fe, who stood guard with the weapon. This pattern was repeated weekly from September through October 1992.
The abuse was interrupted in November when Baby Jane had her menarche but resumed in December. Baby Jane eventually escaped in December 1992 and reported the rapes to her godmother and parents. A medico-legal examination revealed healed hymenal lacerations consistent with prior sexual intercourse. The appellants denied the accusations, claiming the charges were fabricated after a dispute over Baby Jane’s alleged theft.
ISSUE
Whether the prosecution proved the guilt of appellants Butchoy and Fe de la Torre beyond reasonable doubt for nine counts of rape.
RULING
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction for one count of rape (Criminal Case No. 11199) but acquitted the appellants for the eight other counts. The Court found Baby Jane’s testimony for the first rape incident in September 1992 to be credible, convincing, and consistent. Her detailed account of Fe’s indispensable cooperation—by employing force, threat, and intimidation with a scythe to compel Baby Jane’s submission—established conspiracy, making Fe a co-principal under Article 17 of the Revised Penal Code. The medical findings corroborated her claim of sexual abuse.
However, for the eight subsequent charges, the Court applied the principle that while the victim’s testimony alone can sustain a conviction if credible, the prosecution must still prove each criminal act with moral certainty. The Court noted that Baby Jane’s testimony for these later incidents became general and repetitive, lacking the specific details necessary to distinguish each weekly event as a separate offense. The failure to specify distinct dates and circumstances for each alleged rape created reasonable doubt as to whether eight separate crimes occurred. Thus, only the first, specifically testified incident met the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. The appellants were sentenced to reclusion perpetua for the one count and ordered to pay civil indemnity and damages.