G.R. No. 120957 August 22, 1996
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. NITA V. DIZON, accused-appellant.

FACTS

Accused-appellant Nita V. Dizon was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Makati for two counts of estafa under Article 315(2)(d) of the Revised Penal Code and four counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (Bouncing Checks Law). The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction but modified the penalty for estafa to reclusion perpetua pursuant to P.D. No. 818. The case involves a series of transactions between Dizon and private complainant Susan Sandejas Gomez, an Ayala Corporation broker. Dizon and her husband initially engaged Gomez’s services to purchase two residential lots in Ayala Alabang, paying a reservation fee. Subsequently, Dizon urgently solicited cash loans from Gomez, falsely representing a need to purchase auto spare parts. Gomez eventually relented, delivering substantial cash amounts on February 14 and 18, 1986. In exchange, Dizon issued post-dated checks as security. All checks were subsequently dishonored for having been drawn against a closed account.

ISSUE

The core issues are: (1) whether the elements of estafa under Article 315(2)(d) are present; (2) whether the elements of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 are present; (3) whether the usurious nature of the loan transactions exempts Dizon from liability; and (4) whether the Court of Appeals erred in applying P.D. No. 818 to increase the penalty.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions. On estafa, all elements under Article 315(2)(d) were established: Dizon obtained money from Gomez through false pretenses (the urgent need for spare parts and her apparent financial capability shown by the Ayala lot purchase), executed post-dated checks which were subsequently dishonored, and caused damage to Gomez. The Ayala transaction, while ultimately aborted, was part of the deceptive scheme to build Gomez’s confidence and was relevant to establishing fraud. On the B.P. Blg. 22 violations, the elements were met: the checks were issued to apply on account or for value, the maker knew at the time of issue that she did not have sufficient funds, and the checks were dishonored upon presentment.
The Court rejected the defense of usury. A usurious loan is not void ab initio but merely subjects the lender to administrative sanctions. The borrower is not released from the principal obligation. Thus, Dizon’s civil liability to return the money received remained, and her issuance of worthless checks constituted criminal liability. Finally, the application of P.D. No. 818 was proper. The decree amended Article 315 by increasing the penalty for estafa committed by issuing a bouncing check. Since the informations specifically charged estafa under Article 315(2)(d), there was no need to cite P.D. No. 818 explicitly; the decree is a penalty provision, not a substantive element of the crime. The penalties imposed by the Court of Appeals were therefore correct.