G.R. No. 120652 February 11, 1998
EUGENIO DE LA CRUZ, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and CRISTINA MADLANGSAKAY VILLANUEVA, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Eugenio De La Cruz claims ownership of a 407-square meter residential lot in Bulacan, Bulacan, based on over thirty years of open, public, notorious, and adverse possession in the concept of an owner, commencing before September 28, 1987. In October 1959, he mortgaged the disputed land to the parents of private respondent Cristina Madlangsakay Villanueva. In 1973, the Ramos brothers applied for registration of the same land under the Land Registration Act, claiming to be successors-in-interest of a previous possessor. Petitioner opposed the application, which was denied because the land was still part of a forest reserve and thus inalienable. Subsequently, the Ramos brothers successfully pursued the reclassification of the land, were granted ownership, and later sold it to private respondent. Unaware of this, petitioner filed a complaint for reconveyance with damages against private respondent on September 28, 1987. The trial court dismissed the complaint, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal. Petitioner now seeks review, arguing his possession should be recognized under the principle in Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Miguel Marcelo, et al., and that the mortgage contract estops private respondent and her parents from denying his ownership.

ISSUE

Whether petitioner Eugenio De La Cruz has a better right to the disputed land such that he is entitled to reconveyance, despite his long-term possession, given that the land was classified as forest land during his possession and was only reclassified later.

RULING

No. The petition is denied, and the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. Petitioner cannot acquire ownership by prescription because the land was classified as forest land (part of a forest reserve) during his possession and was therefore inalienable and indisposable patrimonial property of the State. Prescription does not run against the State for such property. The case of Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Miguel Marcelo, et al. is inapplicable because there, the possessor’s good faith possession commenced before the land’s classification, whereas here, petitioner possessed the land after it had already been classified as forest land. The principle of estoppel based on the mortgage contract also fails because, at the time of the mortgage, petitioner had no capacity to encumber the land as it was not alienable; he could not be considered its owner in the eyes of the law. Forest lands cannot be acquired by private appropriation, and possession thereof, however long, never ripens into ownership.