GR 119991; (November, 2000) (Digest)
G.R. No. 119991; November 20, 2000
OLIMPIA DIANCIN, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, NORMA ESTAMPADOR BOSQUE, VEVENCIA ESTAMPADOR BEBIDOR, RAUL ESTAMPADOR, AURORA ESTAMPADOR, LUZ ESTAMPADOR BERAMO and FE ESTAMPADOR DECENA, respondents.
FACTS
Tiburcio Estampador, Sr. and Matilde Gulmatico were married in 1933. In 1940, during their marriage, Matilde was granted an Ordinary Fishpond Permit (No. F-1777-0) by the government. Tiburcio died in 1957. In 1967 and 1969, Matilde executed two deeds of sale, transferring the leasehold rights over the fishpond to petitioner Olimpia Diancin. The children of Tiburcio (private respondents) filed a complaint in 1989, seeking the declaration of nullity of the sale and recovery of their father’s conjugal share. They argued the fishpond leasehold right was conjugal property, and Matilde could not validly dispose of the entire interest.
ISSUE
The primary issues were: (1) Whether the fishpond leasehold right granted solely in Matilde’s name constituted conjugal property; and (2) Whether the action to declare the sale null and void had prescribed.
RULING
The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed, with modification, the Court of Appeals’ decision. On the first issue, the Court applied the presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code that all property acquired during the marriage belongs to the conjugal partnership of gains. The fishpond permit was acquired in 1940, during the coverture of the marriage. The fact that it was granted exclusively in Matilde’s name did not overcome this presumption or render it her exclusive paraphernal property. The material point was the time of acquisition, not the registration. Therefore, the leasehold right was conjugal property. Upon Tiburcio’s death, the conjugal partnership was dissolved. Matilde was only entitled to one-half of the leasehold as her conjugal share and a further one-seventh of the remaining half as her share in her husband’s estate. She had no authority to sell the six-sevenths share belonging to her children. Consequently, the sale was void with respect to that portion.
Regarding prescription, the Court ruled that an action for the declaration of the inexistence of a void contract does not prescribe under Article 1410 of the Civil Code. Since Matilde’s disposition of property she did not own was null and void, the defense of prescription was unavailing. The Court further noted that the fishpond permit itself contained a non-transferability clause without government approval, reinforcing the void character of the unauthorized sale. The Supreme Court modified the lower court’s ruling by declaring both deeds of sale entirely null and void, not merely with respect to the six-sevenths share, and ordered reconveyance.