G.R. No. 119747; November 27, 2000
Expectacion Declaro, et al., petitioners, vs. The Hon. Court of Appeals Third Division, Felomino Comorro, et al., respondents.

FACTS

Luciano Comorro owned a 972 sq. m. conjugal lot with his second wife, Matea Diaz. After Luciano and Matea died, their heirs included petitioners (heirs from Luciano’s first marriage) and respondents (heirs from the second marriage and others). In 1960, respondents Felomino and Altesima Comorro executed a “Confirmation of a Deed of Absolute Sale,” stating that Luciano had sold the lot to Enrique Comorro and Gregoria Diaz in 1934, though the original deed was lost. This confirmation deed was registered, leading to the cancellation of the original title and the issuance of a new Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in Gregoria’s name.
In 1990, petitioners, as Luciano’s heirs, filed a complaint for reconveyance, arguing the confirmation deed was void due to lack of proof of the alleged 1934 sale. The Regional Trial Court ruled in their favor, declaring the deed null and void, ordering the cancellation of the TCT, and partitioning the property among all heirs. The court held that an action to declare a void contract does not prescribe.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court and dismissing the complaint for reconveyance based on the doctrines of laches and prescription.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the Court of Appeals. The legal logic centered on laches, not prescription. While an action to declare a void contract may be imprescriptible, the equitable defense of laches can still bar the claim. Laches is the failure or neglect for an unreasonable length of time to assert a right, warranting a presumption that the party entitled has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
The Court found petitioners guilty of laches. Testimony revealed they were aware of Gregoria Diaz’s claim and possession of the property shortly after the war, yet they did not take action until 1990—thirty years after the 1960 registration of the confirmation deed. This registration served as constructive notice to the world. Petitioners’ prolonged inaction, while respondents possessed the land openly and built houses on it, constituted an unreasonable delay prejudicial to respondents. Thus, petitioners were estopped from questioning the title. The Court upheld the validity of the notarized confirmation deed as a public document enjoying the presumption of regularity and concluded that petitioners’ neglect to assert their rights for three decades barred their claim for reconveyance.