GR 118633; (September, 1996) (Digest)
G.R. No. 118633. September 6, 1996. LAPULAPU DEVELOPMENT & HOUSING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. JUDGE TEODORO K. RISOS OF RTC, BRANCH 27, LAPULAPU CITY; GROUP MANAGEMENT CORP. and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Lapulapu Development and Housing Corporation (LLDHC) obtained a loan from respondent GSIS, secured by a mortgage on 78 parcels of land. Due to LLDHC’s failure to pay, GSIS foreclosed and acquired the properties. Before LLDHC could file a complaint for annulment of foreclosure in Manila (Civil Case No. R-82-3429), GSIS executed a Deed of Conditional Sale over the same properties to respondent Group Management Corporation (GMC). GMC later filed a separate complaint for specific performance against GSIS in Lapulapu City (Civil Case No. 2203-L) to compel execution of a final deed of sale. LLDHC intervened in this case, but its motion to dismiss was denied.
The Lapulapu RTC, presided by respondent Judge Risos, rendered a decision on February 24, 1992, ordering GSIS to execute the deed of sale in favor of GMC and dismissing LLDHC’s complaint-in-intervention for lack of legal standing and cause of action. LLDHC’s appeal was dismissed. Subsequently, the Manila RTC ruled in favor of LLDHC in the annulment of foreclosure case. Based on this, LLDHC filed a Petition for Annulment of Judgment with the Court of Appeals against the Lapulapu decision, which was dismissed. This CA decision became final.
ISSUE
Whether the Supreme Court should grant the petition for certiorari to annul the February 24, 1992 decision of the Lapulapu RTC.
RULING
No. The petition is dismissible on procedural grounds. First, the petition, though captioned as a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, is substantively a second petition for annulment of judgment. The grounds raised—lack of jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud—are proper for an annulment of judgment, not certiorari. The Court of Appeals had already dismissed LLDHC’s annulment petition for failure to prove lack of jurisdiction, and that decision attained finality. LLDHC cannot resurrect the same issues via a petition for certiorari.
Second, even if treated as a legitimate Rule 65 petition, it was filed out of time. While Rule 65 does not specify a prescriptive period, jurisprudence mandates that such petitions must be filed within a reasonable time, which is generally three months from the questioned order or from notice thereof. The assailed Lapulapu decision was rendered on February 24, 1992, and LLDHC received a copy on March 3, 1992. The instant petition was filed only on February 2, 1995, nearly three years later. This delay is unreasonable and fatal to the petition. Therefore, the petition is dismissed.