GR 118295; (May, 1997) (Digest)
G.R. No. 118295. May 2, 1997.
Wigberto E. Tañada, et al., petitioners, vs. Edgardo Angara, et al., respondents.
FACTS
Petitioners, comprising senators, representatives, taxpayers, and non-governmental organizations, filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus. They sought to nullify the Philippine Senate’s concurrence in ratifying the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO). The petitioners argued that the WTO Agreement violates specific economic provisions of the 1987 Constitution, particularly those mandating the development of a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos, and requiring preference for qualified Filipinos, domestic labor, materials, and locally produced goods. They contended that the treaty obligations, such as granting national treatment to foreign goods and services, would impair national sovereignty, limit the legislative power of Congress, and undermine the judicial power of the Supreme Court.
The respondents, consisting of senators who concurred with the ratification and key executive officials tasked with implementation, defended the treaty. They asserted that Philippine membership in the WTO was a legitimate exercise of the state’s foreign relations powers, aimed at securing economic benefits like improved market access for exports, a predictable trading system, and access to a binding dispute settlement mechanism. The Senate extended its concurrence by a two-thirds vote, following deliberations on the treaty’s implications.
ISSUE
Whether the Philippine Senate’s concurrence in the ratification of the WTO Agreement is unconstitutional for violating the nationalist economic provisions of the 1987 Constitution.
RULING
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and upheld the constitutionality of the Senate’s concurrence. The Court’s legal logic proceeded from fundamental constitutional principles. First, it emphasized that the power to enter into treaties is an executive function, with the Senate’s role being to provide concurrence. The Senate performed this constitutional duty, and its decision carries a strong presumption of validity. The Court declined to substitute its judgment for the Senate’s on the wisdom of the treaty, as this is a political question pertaining to the conduct of foreign relations.
Second, the Court harmonized the constitutional provisions on nationalism with the broader constitutional framework. It ruled that the economic provisions cited by petitioners are not absolute mandates but statements of policy and principle that must be read in conjunction with other constitutional directives. The Constitution itself, in Article II, Section 2, adheres to the generally accepted principles of international law and adopts a policy of cooperation with other nations. Furthermore, Article XII, Section 10 explicitly allows foreign participation in the national economy, subject to limitations provided by law. The WTO Agreement, which requires reciprocal concessions and national treatment, operates within this constitutional space that permits foreign engagement.
Third, the Court established that treaties do not diminish but are part of the law of the land. Adherence to the WTO does not surrender sovereignty; it is an exercise of sovereignty where the state voluntarily enters into agreements to benefit from a rules-based multilateral trading system. The alleged conflicts with congressional and judicial powers were deemed speculative. Congress retains its authority to enact laws implementing treaty obligations within constitutional bounds, and the Supreme Court retains its power of judicial review over any such laws or acts of government agencies. The petition, therefore, failed to present a clear, unequivocal breach of the Constitution.
