G.R. No. 118141 September 5, 1997
LEONILA GARCIA-RUEDA, petitioner, vs. WILFRED L. PASCASIO, RAUL R. ARNAU, ABELARDO L. APORTADERA JR., Honorable CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, all of the Office of the Ombudsman; JESUS F. GUERRERO, PORFIRIO MACARAEG, and GREGORIO A. ARIZALA, all of the Office of the City Prosecutor, Manila, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Leonila Garcia-Rueda’s husband, Florencio V. Rueda, died six hours after a surgical operation at UST Hospital for the removal of a stone blocking his ureter. The attending surgeon was Dr. Domingo Antonio, Jr. and the anaesthesiologist was Dr. Erlinda Balatbat-Reyes. The hospital attributed the death to complications of “unknown cause.” Petitioner requested the NBI to conduct an autopsy, which ruled the death was due to lack of care by the attending physician in administering anaesthesia and recommended that Dr. Antonio and Dr. Reyes be charged for Homicide through Reckless Imprudence. The preliminary investigation at the Office of the City Prosecutor involved a confounding series of reassignments and contradictory recommendations among nine prosecutors. Initially, Prosecutor Antonio M. Israel inhibited himself. Prosecutor Norberto G. Leono was disqualified. Prosecutor Ramon O. Carisma recommended holding only Dr. Reyes liable. Assistant City Prosecutor Josefina Santos Sioson recommended re-raffling, alleging Prosecutor Carisma’s partiality. Prosecutor Leoncia R. Dimagiba recommended dismissing the complaint against Dr. Reyes and filing an information against Dr. Antonio. While petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of Dimagiba’s resolution was pending, Prosecutor Eudoxia T. Gualberto recommended including Dr. Reyes in the information. Finally, Senior State Prosecutor Gregorio A. Arizala resolved to exonerate Dr. Reyes, a resolution approved by City Prosecutors Porfirio G. Macaraeg and Jesus F. Guerrero. Aggrieved, petitioner filed graft charges for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 against Prosecutors Guerrero, Macaraeg, and Arizala before the Office of the Ombudsman, alleging manifest partiality. The Ombudsman dismissed the complaint for lack of evidence on July 11, 1994.

ISSUE

Whether the Office of the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petitioner’s complaint against the public respondent City Prosecutors for lack of evidence.

RULING

No, the Ombudsman did not commit grave abuse of discretion. The general rule is that courts will not interfere with the Ombudsman’s discretion to determine the specificity and adequacy of the averments of an offense charged, as held in Ocampo v. Ombudsman. While the Supreme Court may review the Ombudsman’s action when there is an abuse of discretion, “grave abuse of discretion” means a power exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility so patent and gross as to amount to evasion of a positive duty. The Court found no such abuse in this case. The Ombudsman acted within his power and authority in dismissing the complaint. The Court noted the odd and unexplained successive transfers of the case among prosecutors but emphasized that whether such transfers were due to outside pressure or ulterior motive is a matter of evidence. The fact that the NBI found negligence is evidentiary and its veracity is best passed upon after a full-blown trial. The City Prosecutors were not in a competent position to pass judgment on such a technical matter as medical negligence, which involves elements of duty, breach, injury, and proximate causation, better ventilated at trial. The petition was dismissed, without prejudice to the petitioner filing an appeal with the Secretary of Justice assailing the dismissal of her criminal complaint by the respondent City Prosecutors.