G.R. No. 116668 July 28, 1997
ERLINDA A. AGAPAY, petitioner, vs. CARLINA (CORNELIA) V. PALANG and HERMINIA P. DELA CRUZ, respondents.

FACTS

Miguel Palang was validly married to private respondent Carlina Vallesterol in 1949. After working abroad, Miguel returned to the Philippines in 1972 and refused to live with Carlina. On July 15, 1973, Miguel contracted a second marriage with the 19-year-old petitioner Erlinda Agapay, which was void due to his existing marriage. Prior to this void marriage, on May 17, 1973, Miguel and Erlinda jointly purchased an agricultural riceland, with the title issued in both their names. On September 23, 1975, a house and lot was purchased, with the title issued solely in Erlinda’s name. Miguel and Carlina had earlier executed a Deed of Donation in 1975, donating their conjugal properties to their daughter Herminia. Miguel died in 1981. In 1981, Carlina and Herminia filed an action for recovery of ownership and possession of the riceland and house and lot against Erlinda. The Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint, declaring Erlinda as owner of the house and lot and one-half of the riceland, and adjudicating the other half of the riceland to Kristopher, Miguel’s son with Erlinda, subject to conditions. The Court of Appeals reversed this decision, declaring the respondents as owners of both properties and ordering their delivery and the cancellation of Erlinda’s titles.

ISSUE

The principal issue is the ownership of the two parcels of land (the riceland and the house and lot) acquired during the cohabitation of petitioner Erlinda Agapay and the deceased Miguel Palang, who was then legally married to respondent Carlina Palang.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals.
1. Regarding the riceland jointly purchased by Miguel and Erlinda, Article 148 of the Family Code applies as they were not capacitated to marry. The provision requires proof of actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry for co-ownership. Erlinda failed to prove she actually contributed to the purchase price. Considering her youth (around 20 years old) at the time of purchase in 1973 and Miguel’s status as a pensioner, the Court found it unrealistic that she contributed her alleged share without proof. Consequently, there was no basis for co-ownership, and the riceland reverted to the conjugal partnership property of Miguel and Carlina.
2. Regarding the house and lot purchased in Erlinda’s name alone, evidence (testimony of the notary public) showed that Miguel provided the purchase money and directed that only Erlinda’s name be used. This transaction constituted a donation from Miguel to Erlinda. Under Article 739 of the Civil Code, such donation is void because it was made between persons guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation. Article 87 of the Family Code extends this prohibition to persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage. Therefore, the donation was void.
3. The Court also held that the prior Deed of Donation of conjugal properties to Herminia did not constitute a judicial separation of property between Miguel and Carlina, nor did it preclude Carlina from claiming the subject properties.
4. On the issue of Kristopher Palang’s successional rights as an illegitimate child, the Supreme Court noted that the need for probate proceedings to settle Miguel’s estate was pointed out, implying that such rights should be resolved in the proper settlement proceedings, not in this action for recovery of property.