GR 116340; (June, 2000) (Digest)
G.R. No. 116340; June 29, 2000
CECILIA GASTON, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. REYNALDO M. ALON, as Judge, Regional Trial Court of Silay City, Branch 40, and GERTRUDES MEDEL, respondents.
FACTS
Private respondent Gertrudes Medel filed a complaint for recovery of her hereditary share in properties left by Mariano de Oca. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s dismissal and rendered a final decision declaring certain Transfer Certificates of Title null and void. It ordered the defendants, including petitioner Cecilia Gaston’s mother, to partition the properties to include Medel’s share within sixty days from finality. The Supreme Court affirmed this decision. After the defendants failed to submit a project of partition, Medel filed a motion to require compliance. The Regional Trial Court, in an Order dated January 17, 1992, granted Medel’s ex-parte motion and directly commissioned a geodetic engineer to segregate and title specific portions in Medel’s name, and ordered the Register of Deeds to cancel an existing title and issue a new one in her name.
Petitioner Gaston filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals on August 7, 1992, assailing the January 17, 1992 Order. She argued the trial court gravely abused its discretion by ordering partition and cancellation of titles without a court-approved project of partition signed by the parties, contrary to the procedure under Rule 69 of the Rules of Court and the specific directive in the final CA decision. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition.
ISSUE
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari which challenged the trial court’s Order for allegedly being issued with grave abuse of discretion.
RULING
The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the Court of Appeals. The core legal logic rests on the doctrine of laches, not on the substantive merits of the alleged procedural irregularities in the partition. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 must be filed within a reasonable time. The Court has consistently ruled that a three-month period is reasonable. Laches is the failure or neglect to assert a right for an unreasonable length of time, warranting a presumption of abandonment.
Here, the challenged Order was issued on January 17, 1992, but the certiorari petition was filed only on August 7, 1992โa delay exceeding seven months. This interval is unreasonable and definitively barred by laches. The Court cited precedents where intervals of seven months and even ninety-nine days were considered fatal. Consequently, regardless of the substantive arguments regarding the trial court’s compliance with Rule 69, the petitioner lost the right to assail the Order due to her unreasonable delay in seeking judicial relief. The dismissal by the Court of Appeals was therefore correct.
