GR 115949; (March, 2000) (Digest)
G.R. No. 115949; March 16, 2000
EVANGELINE J. GABRIEL, ET AL., petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT AND SIMEON SARMIENTO, ET AL., respondents.
FACTS
Petitioners are the Executive Board of the SolidBank Union, the recognized collective bargaining agent. In October 1991, the board decided to retain Atty. Ignacio P. Lacsina as union counsel for CBA negotiations. A general membership meeting was called, and a majority of members approved and signed a resolution authorizing the payment of attorney’s fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the total economic benefits secured. The resolution included an authorization for the employer, Solid Bank Corporation, to check-off these fees directly from the first lump sum payment of CBA benefits to the employees and remit them to the lawyer.
Following the signing of the new CBA in February 1992, the bank made the authorized payroll deductions. Subsequently, a group of union members, the private respondents, filed a complaint with the DOLE alleging illegal deduction of attorney’s fees. The Med-Arbiter ordered the refund of the deducted amounts. On appeal, the Secretary of Labor modified the order, limiting the refund to members who did not consent to the check-off and ruling that the union, not the individual workers, should shoulder the attorney’s fees, with reimbursement to be charged to the union’s general fund.
ISSUE
Did the Secretary of Labor commit grave abuse of discretion in ruling that the reimbursement for the deducted attorney’s fees should be charged to the union’s general fund, and not collected from the individual workers?
RULING
No. The Supreme Court affirmed the Secretary of Labor’s order, finding no grave abuse of discretion. The legal logic centers on the interpretation of Article 222(b) of the Labor Code, which prohibits attorney’s fees in negotiation or collective bargaining agreements being charged against union members, except those who authorized the payment. The Court clarified that this provision aims to prevent the imposition of payment obligations on individual workers from their own personal funds.
The authorization for check-off, even if signed by a majority, does not legitimize shifting the primary obligation to pay attorney’s fees from the union to the individual workers. The obligation to pay for professional services rendered to the union in CBA negotiations is inherently a union responsibility, payable from union funds. The check-off mechanism for attorney’s fees from individual wage benefits is permissible only if it functions as a reimbursement to the union’s fund, not as a direct payment from the worker’s pocket. Therefore, any deduction made without a worker’s individual written authorization is illegal. Consequently, the proper remedy is to charge the expense to the union’s general fund, ensuring that members who did not consent are not compelled to pay individually. The assailed order correctly applied this principle.