G.R. No. 114732; August 1, 2000
ESTRELLA TIONGCO YARED (substituted by CARMEN MATILDE M. TIONGCO) vs. HON. RICARDO M. ILARDE, et al.

FACTS

Petitioner Estrella Tiongco Yared filed an action for annulment of affidavit of adjudication, sales, and titles, and for reconveyance against respondent Jose B. Tiongco. She alleged that he fraudulently registered two parcels of land in his name alone, to the exclusion of other heirs, including herself. To protect her interest during litigation, she caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens on the relevant titles. The trial court eventually dismissed her complaint on the ground of prescription. Petitioner appealed. During the pendency of the appeal, respondent Tiongco filed multiple motions for cancellation of the lis pendens. After several denials, the trial judge granted the third motion, cancelling the notice. Petitioner sought reconsideration, and the judge initially reversed himself, citing loss of jurisdiction due to the perfected appeal. However, upon respondent’s further motion, the judge reinstated the cancellation order.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court gravely abused its discretion in ordering the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens after it had dismissed the main case and an appeal had been perfected.

RULING

Yes, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court emphasized that a notice of lis pendens is a mere incident of the main action, intended to advise third parties of the pending litigation over the property. Its continuance is not contingent on a final judgment. The trial court’s power to cancel a notice of lis pendens is discretionary but must be exercised within the bounds of the law. The legal grounds for cancellation are strictly limited to a showing that the notice was filed to “molest” the adverse party or that it is “not necessary to protect the rights” of the party who caused its annotation. The trial court’s reasoning—that the dismissal on prescription made a reversal remote and that the continued annotation was unfair to the titled owner—did not constitute a proper legal basis under the rule. The assessment of the strength of the appeal is a matter for the appellate court, not the trial court. By cancelling the notice based on its own evaluation of the merits of the appealed case, the trial court effectively prejudged the appeal and deprived the petitioner of a statutory protection designed to preserve the status quo during appellate review. This overreach constituted a capricious and whimsical exercise of power, amounting to grave abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari.