GR 114302; (September, 1995) (Digest)
G.R. No. 114302 September 29, 1995
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. CAMILO O. MONTESA, JR., as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Malolos, Bulacan, APOLONIO CRUZ and BERNARDA CRUZ, respondents.
FACTS
Private respondents Apolonio and Bernarda Cruz were charged with Falsification of Public Document before the Regional Trial Court. After the information was filed, the accused filed a petition for reinvestigation, which the respondent judge granted. Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Edsel Rutor conducted the reinvestigation and issued a resolution recommending the dismissal of the case based on a new affidavit from Feliza Constantino, who claimed sole responsibility for preparing the questioned document. However, Provincial Prosecutor Liberato Reyes disapproved this resolution, noting that the affidavit did not constitute an admission of falsification and that the issue of the accused’s guilt was a matter for the court to decide.
ISSUE
Whether the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the criminal case immediately after arraignment based solely on the assistant prosecutor’s resolution, despite its disapproval by the provincial prosecutor.
RULING
Yes. The Supreme Court granted the petition, annulled the dismissal order, and reinstated the information. The Court held that the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion. Under the doctrine established in Crespo v. Mogul, once an information is filed in court, any disposition of the case, including its dismissal, rests within the court’s sound discretion. However, this discretion is not absolute. The trial court cannot rely solely on a prosecutor’s resolution recommending dismissal when that resolution has been expressly disapproved by the superior prosecuting officer, in this case, the Provincial Prosecutor. The Provincial Prosecutor’s disapproval meant there was no final recommendation from the prosecution to dismiss the case. By dismissing the case based on a resolution lacking final authority, the judge preempted the prosecution’s right to present evidence and deprived the court of the opportunity to evaluate the merits based on a full trial. The judge’s act was a capricious and whimsical exercise of power, equivalent to a lack of jurisdiction. The proper course was to proceed with the trial to determine the accused’s guilt or innocence based on the evidence. The Court also noted the procedural defect of the petition being filed by the private prosecutor but addressed the merits due to the substantive error involved.
