GR 112884; (August, 1994) (Digest)
G.R. No. 112884. August 30, 1994. PLACIDO O. URBANES, JR., petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Placido O. Urbanes, Jr. filed a complaint for injunction and damages against respondent National Power Corporation (NPC) after his security service contracts were terminated. The trial court initially granted a writ of preliminary injunction. NPC’s subsequent petitions to the Court of Appeals to annul this writ were dismissed. The trial court eventually decided in favor of Urbanes, making the injunction permanent and awarding damages. NPC appealed this decision to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals’ First Division, through a Decision penned by Associate Justice Eduardo G. Montenegro, modified the trial court’s judgment. It reversed the award of damages and the permanent injunction against contract termination but affirmed the injunction against NPC’s order banning Urbanes from future biddings. Urbanes filed a motion for reconsideration and a subsequent motion for Justice Montenegro’s inhibition, citing that prior to his appellate appointment, Justice Montenegro, as Acting Solicitor General, had represented NPC in this very case. Justice Montenegro then inhibited himself.
ISSUE
Whether the participation of Justice Eduardo G. Montenegro in the deliberation and promulgation of the Court of Appeals’ Decision rendered the proceedings void, considering his prior role as counsel for a party.
RULING
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that Justice Montenegro’s participation invalidated the proceedings. The legal logic is grounded on Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court, which mandates the disqualification of a judge who has previously acted as counsel in the same case, unless with the written consent of all parties. The rationale is to preserve absolute faith and confidence in the courts by ensuring judgments are free from any suspicion of bias, partiality, or preconceived interest. A judge is prohibited from handling a case where they might be perceived, rightly or wrongly, as susceptible to impropriety.
While the Court acknowledged Justice Montenegro’s explanation of inadvertence and his subsequent voluntary inhibition, his initial participation had a substantive legal consequence. With his disqualification, the remaining two members of the three-member Division could no longer constitute a quorum for a valid deliberation or promulgation of a judgment under the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals. Consequently, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action, effectively setting aside the challenged Decision and requiring a new deliberation by a properly constituted division.