G.R. No. 112089 & 112737, January 24, 2001
Remedios A. Dupasquier, et al. vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals, et al. / Hon. Eduardo G. Montenegro, et al. vs. Court of Appeals and Fortunato M. Dizon, Jr.

FACTS

These consolidated petitions arose from the prosecution of Banco Filipino officials for estafa through irregular grant of loans to corporate subsidiaries. After a complaint was filed in 1987, a preliminary investigation led to the filing of Informations in 1988. Several accused, including petitioners Dupasquier, et al. and respondent Dizon, sought reinvestigation. A panel of prosecutors recommended dismissal for lack of probable cause. However, Provincial Prosecutor Mauro Castro reversed this, ordering prosecution. The accused sought relief from the Secretary of Justice, but their petitions were denied. Dupasquier, et al. and Dizon then filed separate petitions for certiorari with the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals rendered divergent decisions. In CA-G.R. SP No. 28867, it dismissed the petition of Dupasquier, et al., upholding the finding of probable cause. Subsequently, in CA-G.R. SP No. 27922, it granted Dizon’s petition, annulled the Secretary of Justice’s resolution, and ordered the dismissal of the cases against him. Dupasquier, et al., upon learning of Dizon’s favorable ruling, filed a supplemental motion, arguing they were similarly situated and entitled to the same relief. The appellate court denied their motion.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition of Dupasquier, et al. while granting that of their co-accused Dizon, despite alleged similar circumstances.

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions and affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decisions. The Court held that no grave abuse of discretion attended the appellate court’s rulings. The finding of probable cause is an executive function, primarily vested in the prosecutor, whose determination is generally not subject to judicial review unless made with grave abuse of discretion. The Court found no such abuse in the prosecutor’s decision to proceed against Dupasquier, et al.
Crucially, the Court ruled that the disposition of a co-accused’s case does not automatically dictate the outcome for others. The grant of Dizon’s petition was based on the specific merits and evidence pertinent to his individual case. The principle of equality under the law does not mean identical treatment for all accused irrespective of distinct factual and legal circumstances. Each case must be judged on its own merits. The petitioners failed to substantiate their claim of being similarly situated in all material respects with Dizon to warrant a uniform dismissal. Therefore, the Court of Appeals did not err in treating the petitions separately and rendering different judgments based on independent assessments of each case’s unique factual matrix.