G.R. Nos. 112389-90 August 1, 1994
Mercedes D. Navarro, petitioner, vs. The Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Mercedes D. Navarro was convicted of violating Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (B.P. 22) by the Regional Trial Court. She appealed to the Court of Appeals, which granted her a 90-day extension to file her appellant’s brief. However, Navarro failed to file the brief within the extended period. Consequently, the appellate court dismissed her appeal for failure to prosecute under the Rules of Court.
Subsequently, Navarro filed a motion for new trial with the Court of Appeals, alleging newly discovered evidence. The appellate court denied this motion. It ruled that while its dismissal resolution was not yet final when the motion was filed, Navarro should have first moved for reconsideration of the dismissal to reinstate the appeal. The court noted the dismissal had become final due to the lack of a reconsideration motion. Navarro then filed a motion for reconsideration, which was also denied.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in denying Navarro’s motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence after her appeal was dismissed for failure to file the appellant’s brief.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the Court of Appeals. The legal logic proceeds from procedural and substantive grounds. Procedurally, while a motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence can be filed under Rule 124, Section 14 of the Rules of Court after an appeal is perfected but before the judgment becomes final, the appellate court’s discretion to deny it was not exercised capriciously. Navarro filed the motion only after her appeal was dismissed, without offering any prior explanation for her failure to file the brief or seeking reinstatement of the appeal. This demonstrated a lack of diligence.
Substantively, the alleged newly discovered evidence—an undated receipt for payment to a saleslady—was insufficient to warrant a new trial. For a B.P. 22 conviction, payment within five banking days from notice of dishonor is a complete defense that rebuts the prima facie presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds. The proffered receipt, being undated, could not prove payment was made within this crucial period. The evidence was merely corroborative and not of such weight as to probably change the judgment. The trial court’s observations on the evidence’s incredibility were affirmed. Thus, the denial of the motion for new trial was proper.