GR 1114; (March, 1903) (Digest)
G.R. No. 1114 : March 31, 1903
THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appellee, vs. BARTOLOME OSTREA, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
FACTS:
The defendants went to the house of Juan Rodriguez with the intent to enter against his will. The evidence shows they entered a first door (described as a “front door”), but it is unclear if this door was an integral part of the house or an outer door separate from the main structure. Upon seeing the defendants, Rodriguez closed a second door, preventing them from entering the house proper. The defendants attempted to force this second door open for nearly half an hour. During this attempt, defendant Bartolome Ostrea fired shots from a revolver (with conflicting testimony on the number of shots) to intimidate Rodriguez into opening the door. It was established that the defendants were drunk at the time but were not habitual drunkards. Furthermore, Bartolome Ostrea was the son-in-law of the complainant, Juan Rodriguez, and believed his wife (Rodriguez’s daughter) was inside the house.
ISSUE:
Whether the defendants are guilty of the consummated crime of forcible entry into a dwelling or only of an attempted forcible entry.
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that the defendants are guilty only of attempted forcible entry, not the consummated crime. The Court concluded from the evidence that while the defendants entered an outer door, they did not succeed in entering the dwelling house itself. The act, executed with violence and intimidation (the firing of a revolver), falls under paragraph 2, Article 491 of the Penal Code.
The Court considered the following mitigating circumstances in favor of the defendants:
1. Drunkenness (Article 9, No. 6 of the Penal Code), as they were intoxicated at the time but not habitual drunkards.
2. The close relationship between Bartolome Ostrea and the complainant (father-in-law and son-in-law) under Article 10, paragraph 1, as it suggested the defendant did not regard himself as a stranger to the dwelling. This relationship, coupled with his belief that his wife was inside, may have led him to erroneously believe he had a right to enter.
Applying the relevant provisions of the Penal Code (Articles 66, 75, 91[2], and 92), the Court modified the lower court’s judgment. Each defendant was sentenced to a fine of 325 pesetas, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of nonpayment at the rate of one day for every 12 ½ pesetas. The modified judgment was affirmed.
