G.R. No. 111180 November 16, 1995
DAISIE T. DAVID, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and RAMON R. VILLAR, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Daisie T. David, the secretary of private respondent Ramon R. Villar, a married man, bore three illegitimate children with him, including a son, Christopher J. In 1991, Villar, after taking Christopher J. on a family trip, refused to return the child to David, asserting he had enrolled the boy in school. David subsequently filed a petition for habeas corpus to regain custody. The Regional Trial Court ruled in her favor, awarding her custody and ordering Villar to provide child support.
The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision. It held that a habeas corpus proceeding was improper for determining custody in this context, as the remedy traditionally applies to disputes between legally married but separated parents. The appellate court reasoned that, since an illegitimate child is under the sole parental authority of the mother by law, the issue of custody and support should be threshed out in a singularly filed case for that purpose. It dismissed the petition, allowing the child to temporarily remain with Villar pending a proper case.

ISSUE

Whether a writ of habeas corpus is the proper remedy for the natural mother of an illegitimate child to regain custody from the father who is unlawfully detaining the child.

RULING

Yes. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the RTC decision. The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases where rightful custody of any person is withheld from one entitled thereto. The appellate court erred in limiting its application only to custody disputes between married but separated parents. The law makes no such distinction.
Christopher J. is an illegitimate child. Under Article 176 of the Family Code, parental authority over an illegitimate child is vested solely in the mother. Consequently, David, as the mother, is entitled to custody as an incident of that parental authority. Villar’s act of withholding the child constituted an unlawful deprivation of her rightful custody, making habeas corpus the appropriate remedy. His recognition of the child is relevant only to the child’s right to support, not to custody.
Furthermore, Article 213 of the Family Code mandates that no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, absent compelling reasons. At the time of the RTC decision, Christopher J. was under seven, and no such compelling reasons were shown. The Court also noted that even as the child grew older, his expressed preference to live with his mother, who was not shown to be unfit, fortified her right to custody. The fact that Villar is wealthier is not a legal basis to deprive the mother of custody, especially when she has demonstrated capability and dedication in rearing her children. The order for temporary support was justified by Villar’s willingness to provide it and stands independently from the custody award.