GR 111130; (August, 1998) (Digest)
G.R. No. 111130 August 19, 1998
LAURA Z. VELASCO, petitioner, vs. HON. MANUEL CASACLANG, as Deputy Ombudsman for AFP and COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondents.
FACTS
The Commission on Audit (COA) conducted a special audit of selected transactions of the AFP Logistics Command. The audit report found the procurement of 28,432 stainless steel meat cans for CAFGU, amounting to P3,502,432, to be of doubtful validity. The audit noted that the entire transaction cycle was completed in one day (December 29, 1988), the bids were allegedly opened six days before the bidder tender sheets were submitted, and three of the four winning suppliers had common incorporators, including petitioner Laura Z. Velasco. The audit also found that supplying stainless steel cans instead of aluminum cans resulted in over P1 million in additional expenses. Based on this report, COA audit examiners filed a Joint Affidavit-Complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman. The Deputy Ombudsman for the Military issued an order directing the respondents, including Velasco, to file their counter-affidavits. Velasco filed a motion to direct the complainants to particularize the offenses charged. The Deputy Ombudsman issued an order stating she was charged with violations of Section 3(e) and (g) of R.A. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). Velasco filed a Motion to Quash, arguing the complaint did not charge an offense. The Deputy Ombudsman denied the Motion to Quash, citing that Administrative Order No. 07 of the Ombudsman does not allow such a motion, and subsequently denied her Motion for Reconsideration. Velasco filed the present petition for Certiorari and Prohibition.
ISSUE
1. Whether the respondent Deputy Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion in holding that petitioner is charged under Section 3(e) and (g) of R.A. 3019 and in denying the Motion to Quash.
2. Whether the petitioner had no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law except the present petition.
RULING
The Supreme Court DISMISSED the petition and UPHELD the assailed Orders.
1. The respondent Deputy Ombudsman did not act with grave abuse of discretion. The Court ruled that the Ombudsman and his Deputies are authorized by law to conduct preliminary investigations, as they are considered “other officers as may be authorized by law” under the Rules of Criminal Procedure. This authority is derived from Section 15(1) of R.A. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989), which grants the Office of the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. The power to conduct preliminary investigation is inherent in the Ombudsman’s constitutional and statutory mandate to investigate. The Deputy Ombudsman was therefore acting within his jurisdiction.
2. The petitioner had a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The proper remedy was for Velasco to file her counter-affidavit during the preliminary investigation. In that pleading, she could have raised her defenses, including her argument that the complaint did not charge an offense. By choosing to file a Motion to Quash instead of her counter-affidavit, she waived her right to be heard, and the Deputy Ombudsman was correct in proceeding accordingly. A petition for certiorari was not the appropriate remedy as there was no grave abuse of discretion, and an adequate remedy existed.