G.R. No. 110886 , December 20, 1994
Rosalio L. Florendo, petitioner, vs. Court of Appeals and Hon. Josefina Ceballos, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, Capas, Tarlac, and Central Bank of the Philippines, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Rosalio L. Florendo was found guilty of falsification of commercial documents by the Regional Trial Court. The promulgation of judgment was scheduled for June 15, 1992. On that date, petitioner was absent, but his counsel was present and moved for a resetting, which the trial judge denied. The promulgation proceeded in petitioner’s absence, and his counsel acknowledged receipt of a copy of the decision. Subsequently, on June 16, 1992, the trial judge issued an order amending the decision solely to delete the name of a co-accused who was never arraigned. The court later issued warrants of arrest for the accused, including petitioner, for failure to renew bail bonds.
Petitioner filed a notice of appeal on July 6, 1992, which the trial court denied for being filed out of time. His subsequent motions were also denied. Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Court of Appeals, challenging the trial court’s orders. The appellate court dismissed the petition, prompting this appeal to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE

The primary issues are: (1) whether promulgation of a judgment of conviction for less grave felonies may be made in absentia; (2) whether an amended decision deleting a co-accused necessitates re-promulgation; and (3) whether petitioner’s appeal should be given due course.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the petition. The resolution hinges on the interpretation of Section 6, Rule 120 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. The rule mandates the accused’s personal presence at promulgation, except for light offenses where appearance through counsel suffices. However, its third paragraph provides that if the accused fails to appear after notice, promulgation shall consist of recording the judgment in the criminal docket and serving a copy on the accused or counsel. This provision on promulgation in absentia was introduced precisely to prevent an accused from frustrating the judicial process by jumping bail.
Here, the offenses were less grave felonies, not light offenses, so the exception for counsel’s appearance did not apply. Nevertheless, promulgation in absentia was validly effected under the rule because petitioner, though absent, was duly represented by counsel who received a copy of the decision on June 15, 1992. This service started the 15-day period to appeal, which expired on June 30, 1992. His notice of appeal filed on July 6, 1992 was therefore correctly denied as tardy.
Regarding the amended decision, the modification pertained only to the exclusion of a co-accused and did not affect petitioner’s conviction. Since petitioner’s judgment had already been validly promulgated, no re-promulgation was required. The Court upheld the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties, noting petitioner did not contest the recording of the judgment in the criminal docket. Thus, all challenged orders were affirmed.