G.R. No. 110872 April 18, 1997
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ALEX GARMA, accused-appellant.

FACTS

On the evening of December 2, 1987, Herminigildo Isidro heard gunshots and his uncle, Sixto Selma, cry for help. Herminigildo alerted relatives, and they proceeded to find Sixto wounded on the ground. Upon being asked by Herminigildo who shot him, Sixto responded, “They were three (3) but I recognize[d] only Alex Garma.” Sixto was rushed to the hospital but died hours later from multiple gunshot wounds.
Appellant Alex Garma was charged with Murder. The prosecution’s case hinged on Sixto’s ante-mortem statement, as testified to by four witnesses. The defense presented alibi, claiming Garma was watching television at his grandfather’s house during the incident, corroborated by several witnesses. The trial court convicted Garma, a decision affirmed by the Court of Appeals, which increased the penalty to reclusion perpetua.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in convicting the appellant based on the victim’s dying declaration and as part of res gestae, and in rejecting the defense of alibi.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. The victim’s statement identifying Garma was correctly admitted both as a dying declaration and as part of the res gestae. For a dying declaration, all requisites were present: it concerned the crime and circumstances of his death; it was made under a consciousness of impending death, evidenced by his fatal wounds; the declarant was competent; and it was offered in a murder case where he was the victim. Simultaneously, the statement was admissible as part of res gestae because it was made spontaneously shortly after the shooting incident, before any opportunity for fabrication.
The positive identification through this declaration utterly destroyed the defense of alibi. Jurisprudence consistently holds that alibi cannot prevail over positive identification, especially when established by a dying declaration. The Court found no merit in the appellant’s challenge to the witnesses’ credibility, noting that minor inconsistencies on collateral details do not undermine the core consistency of their testimonies regarding the victim’s identification of his assailant. The qualifying circumstance of treachery was also correctly appreciated, as the sudden and unexpected attack without provocation deprived the victim of any chance to defend himself.