GR 110289; (October, 1994) (Digest)
G.R. No. 110289. October 7, 1994.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SALVADOR BALISTEROS y FLORES and NILO AVESTRO y CARDONA, accused-appellants.
FACTS
The accused-appellants, Salvador Balisteros and Nilo Avestro, along with Ernesto Galvante, were charged with Murder for the killing of Romeo Abad on August 16, 1991, in Pandi, Bulacan. The information alleged conspiracy, treachery, and evident premeditation. During trial, Galvante was discharged to become a state witness. The prosecution evidence, primarily from eyewitness Eliza Merceada, established that on the morning of the incident, the three accused were drinking in Balisteros’s hut. Later, while Merceada was walking, she heard two shouts of “huwag” from a bamboo grove. She then saw all three accused hurriedly emerging from that grove, with Balisteros carrying a bolo. They later followed her, changed their clothes, bought sandals, and fled. Abad’s body was subsequently found in the bamboo grove with fatal wounds.
ISSUE
The core issue is whether the prosecution proved the guilt of the accused-appellants beyond reasonable doubt, particularly in light of their defenses of denial and alibi, and the trial court’s appreciation of the qualifying and aggravating circumstances.
RULING
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. The defense of denial and alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification by eyewitness Merceada, who had no ill motive to testify falsely. Her testimony was clear, consistent, and credible, detailing the appellants’ presence at the scene and their immediate flight. The Court found conspiracy was sufficiently established by their collective actions before, during, and after the crime—drinking together, emerging from the crime scene, and fleeing in unison. The trial court correctly appreciated treachery, as the attack was sudden and rendered the victim defenseless. However, the Supreme Court modified the penalty. The lower court erroneously treated aggravating circumstances like abuse of superior strength and uninhabited place as separate from treachery; these are already absorbed by the qualifying circumstance of treachery. Since no other aggravating or mitigating circumstances remained, the penalty for Murder is reclusion perpetua to death. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law is not permissible for crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua. Thus, the penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed by the trial court was correct. The award of damages was sustained.
