G.R. No. 109767 September 3, 1996
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROLANDO MONTEREY y QUINDOZA, accused-appellant.

FACTS

Accused-appellant Rolando Monterey, along with Abner Montero and Marion Mirasol, was charged with two counts of murder for the killings of Simeon Padolina and Reynaldo Penaverde, and with robbery for stealing items from the Marcopper Golf Club Canteen. The cases were jointly tried. During trial, the prosecution moved for the discharge of accused Abner Montero to become a state witness, which the trial court granted. Montero testified that on the night of the incident, he, Mirasol, and Monterey conspired to commit robbery. After the robbery, they encountered the two young victims. Monterey, without provocation, attacked and killed both victims with a bolo. The trial court convicted Monterey of two counts of murder and robbery.

ISSUE

The primary issue is whether the trial court erred in convicting accused-appellant based on the testimony of a discharged co-accused turned state witness, and in appreciating the aggravating circumstances of recidivism and habituality.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. The testimony of a discharged co-accused, if credible and corroborated by other evidence, is sufficient to sustain a conviction. Montero’s testimony was found to be clear, consistent, and corroborated by the physical evidence and the testimonies of other witnesses regarding the recovery of stolen items and the circumstances of the killings. The Court upheld the finding of conspiracy, as Monterey’s active participation in the robbery and his execution of the unprovoked killings demonstrated a community of criminal design. Regarding the aggravating circumstances, the Court clarified the distinction between recidivism and habituality. Recidivism applies when the previous and subsequent crimes fall under the same title of the Revised Penal Code. Here, Monterey’s previous final conviction was for murder, and the new conviction was for robbery, which are under different titles; thus, recidivism was improperly applied. Instead, the aggravating circumstance of habituality was correctly appreciated, as it requires that the offender has been previously punished for an offense to which the law attaches an equal or greater penalty. The certified copy of the previous murder conviction was duly presented. With habituality present and no mitigating circumstances, the penalty for robbery was properly imposed in its maximum period. The penalty was modified to an indeterminate sentence of four years, nine months, and eleven days to six years of prision correccional maximum.