G.R. No. 10905, December 9, 1916
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CASIANO MARFORI, defendant-appellant.

FACTS:
The defendant, Casiano Marfori, was convicted in the Court of First Instance of the crime of injurias graves (aggravated slander) and sentenced to banishment (destierro), a fine, and costs. The complaint originally filed in the justice of the peace court alleged that the accused spoke of the complaining witness in a manner that damaged her virtue and reputation. After a preliminary investigation, the justice of the peace discharged the accused, believing the offense was merely a misdemeanor and not the grave crime charged. The provincial fiscal, upon receiving the report of the proceedings, filed an information in the Court of First Instance based on the same facts. The accused was arraigned and tried without a new preliminary investigation or an order remanding him for trial. The accused objected to the trial, arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction because no committing magistrate had found probable cause to hold him for trial after a preliminary investigation. The trial judge overruled the objection, holding that the justice of the peace had erred in discharging the accused and that the report showed probable cause. The accused stood mute at arraignment, and a plea of not guilty was entered for him.

ISSUE:
Whether the Court of First Instance acquired jurisdiction to try the accused without a preliminary investigation resulting in an order remanding him for trial, over his objection.

RULING:
No. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction and remanded the case for further proceedings. The right to a preliminary investigation before a committing magistrate for crimes cognizable by Courts of First Instance is a substantial right, secured by law (General Orders No. 58, Sections 13 and 14, and Act No. 1627, Section 37). This right ensures that an accused is spared the burden and expense of a formal trial unless a competent officer finds reasonable probability of guilt. Denial of this right, over the accused’s objection, constitutes a violation of due process.

In this case, the justice of the peace discharged the accused after a preliminary investigation. That discharge, while not a bar to rearrest and a new prosecution, did not constitute a commitment for trial. Neither the fiscal nor the trial judge could use the record of that investigation to bring the accused to trial over his objection, as doing so would nullify the purpose of the preliminary investigation. If the fiscal believed the discharge was erroneous, the proper procedure was to secure the accused’s rearrest upon a new complaint and conduct a second preliminary investigation before a justice of the peace or the Court of First Instance judge acting as a committing magistrate. Since the accused was tried without being remanded for trial after a proper preliminary investigation, and he objected timely, the trial court lacked jurisdiction. The judgment was reversed, with costs de officio, and the record was remanded for appropriate proceedings.