G.R. No. 108870 July 14, 1995
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK and NATIONAL INVESTMENT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. RODOLFO A. ORTIZ, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 89, CLARA REYES PASTOR and OTHER STOCKHOLDERS OF C & C COMMERCIAL CORPORATION and C & C COMMERCIAL CORPORATION, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioners PNB and NIDC sought reconsideration of a Supreme Court decision dated March 3, 1994, which upheld the dismissal of their appeal for being filed out of time. The trial court’s decision was sent via registered mail to petitioners’ counsel, Atty. Avamor Perez, at the “6th Floor, PNB Bldg., Escolta, Manila.” The registry return receipt was signed on January 23, 1992, by Catalino Sandoval, a PNB mailing clerk from the Mailing Division. The mail was then forwarded internally and reached the Legal Department’s Litigation and Collection Division on January 28, 1992. The notice of appeal was filed on February 10, 1992.
The trial court, affirmed by the Court of Appeals and initially by the Supreme Court, ruled that receipt occurred on January 23, 1992, when the mailing clerk received it, making the appeal filed three days late. The court based this on estoppel, noting that counsel had previously accepted all court notices and orders through the same mailing division without objection. Petitioners argued that receipt should be counted from January 28, when the legal department actually received it, rendering the appeal timely.

ISSUE

Whether the petitioners are deemed to have received a copy of the trial court’s decision on January 23, 1992, when received by the PNB mailing clerk, or on January 28, 1992, when delivered to the Legal Department.

RULING

The Supreme Court, in its Resolution, DENIED the motion for reconsideration. It held that service was complete upon receipt by the PNB mailing clerk on January 23, 1992. The legal logic rests on the application of the “received by counsel” rule and the principle of estoppel. Service to a clerk authorized to receive mail at the address of record is valid service upon the counsel of record. The address provided was the PNB Building, and the mailing clerk was a duly authorized agent to receive correspondence for the bank and its personnel, including the counsel.
Crucially, the Court emphasized that petitioners’ counsel had consistently, throughout the proceedings, accepted service of all court notices and orders through this same mailing division without any prior protest. By this voluntary and deliberate conduct, petitioners are estopped from questioning the validity of the service. To allow a different rule for the final decision alone would be prejudicial and contrary to orderly procedure. The period to appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional; the three-day delay, attributable to internal corporate mail routing, cannot excuse non-compliance. The Court affirmed that appeals must be perfected within the reglementary period provided by law, and exceptions cannot be made based on equitable grounds when the delay stems from a party’s chosen internal procedures.