G.R. No. 108854 . June 14, 1994.
MA. PAZ FERNANDEZ KROHN, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and EDGAR KROHN, JR., respondents.

FACTS

Edgar Krohn, Jr. and Ma. Paz Fernandez were married in 1964. Their relationship became strained, and in 1971, Ma. Paz underwent psychological testing. They separated in 1973. In 1975, Edgar obtained a confidential psychiatric evaluation report on Ma. Paz prepared by Drs. Cornelio Banaag, Jr. and Baltazar Reyes. In 1978, using this report, Edgar obtained a decree from the Tribunal Metropolitanum Matrimoniale nullifying their church marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. In 1990, Edgar filed a petition for annulment of marriage in the Regional Trial Court, citing the confidential psychiatric report. During the hearing on May 8, 1991, Edgar took the witness stand to testify on the contents of the report. Ma. Paz objected, invoking the physician-patient privileged communication rule under Section 24(c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. The trial court overruled the objection, admitting the report in evidence, and later denied her motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals dismissed her petition for certiorari. Ma. Paz now seeks to enjoin the disclosure of the psychiatric report and to admit her “Statement for the Record” into the case records.

ISSUE

Whether the husband, Edgar Krohn, Jr., who is not a physician, can be prohibited from testifying on the contents of a confidential psychiatric evaluation report concerning his wife, Ma. Paz Fernandez Krohn, based on the physician-patient privileged communication rule.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the petition. The physician-patient privilege under Section 24(c), Rule 130 applies only to a physician, surgeon, or obstetrician who acquired information while attending to a patient in a professional capacity. The person against whom the privilege is claimed in this case is the husband, not a physician. Therefore, the prohibition does not extend to him. The Court cited Lim v. Court of Appeals, which outlines the requisites for invoking the privilege, including that the person against whom it is claimed must be duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery, or obstetrics—a condition not met here. The husband’s testimony does not circumvent the rule, as it lacks the force and effect of testimony from the examining physician. The Court also noted that the privilege may be waived, and Ma. Paz’s failure to specifically object on grounds of privilege in her Answer (only calling the report “unfounded or irrelevant”) could imply waiver. Regarding the “Statement for the Record,” the trial court properly ordered it stricken off as it was an unverified amendment to her Answer. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed.