GR 96882; (March, 1996) (Digest)
March 15, 2026AM 2208; (February, 1981) (Digest)
March 15, 2026G.R. No. 108581 December 8, 1999
LOURDES L. DOROTHEO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, NILDA D. QUINTANA, for Herself and as Attorney-in-Fact of VICENTE DOROTHEO and JOSE DOROTHEO, respondents.
FACTS
Alejandro Dorotheo died, leaving a last will and testament. Petitioner Lourdes Dorotheo, who cared for Alejandro but was not his lawful wife, filed for its probate. In 1981, the court admitted the will to probate. Private respondents, the legitimate children of Alejandro and his predeceased spouse, did not appeal this order. In 1983, they filed a motion to declare the will intrinsically void, arguing its provisions impaired their legitime. The trial court granted this in a 1986 order, declaring the will intrinsically void and naming the private respondents as the only heirs. Petitioner’s appeal to the Court of Appeals was dismissed for failure to file a brief, making the 1986 order final and executory by 1989.
Subsequently, the trial court issued a writ of execution. However, in 1990, a new judge set aside the 1986 final order, deeming it merely interlocutory. The Court of Appeals nullified this 1990 order, reinstating the 1986 order. Petitioner now seeks review, arguing the trial judge had jurisdiction to revisit the order and contesting the intrinsic invalidity declaration of a probated will.
ISSUE
May a final and executory order declaring a probated will intrinsically void be set aside by the trial court, and is such a declaration permissible after probate?
RULING
No, the trial court cannot set aside a final and executory order. The Supreme Court denied the petition, affirming the Court of Appeals. A fundamental rule is that a final and executory judgment can no longer be altered, even if erroneous. The 1986 order had attained finality. By setting it aside, the trial court effectively reversed a final judgment of a superior court (the Court of Appeals), which violates the doctrine of hierarchy of courts and the principle of finality of judgments.
On the substantive issue, the Court clarified the distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic validity in probate. Probate proceedings primarily settle the extrinsic validity of a will, examining its due execution, the testator’s capacity, and compliance with formalities. An order admitting a will to probate is conclusive on its extrinsic validity. However, intrinsic validity, which concerns the legality of the testamentary dispositions themselves, remains open for question even after probate. A will may be extrinsically valid but intrinsically void if its provisions contravene mandatory laws, such as by impairing the compulsory heirs’ legitime. Therefore, the trial court correctly declared the will intrinsically void in its 1986 order, as it unlawfully deprived the legitimate children of their inheritance. This declaration did not contradict the probate order but addressed a separate, permissible issue.
