G.R. No. 108232 August 23, 1993
ZONSAYDA L. ALINSUG, petitioner, vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Branch 58, San Carlos City, Negros Occidental, Presided by Hon. Rolindo D. Beldia, Jr.; ROLANDO P. PONSICA as Municipal Mayor of Escalante, Negros Occidental; MUNICIPALITY OF ESCALANTE, NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, and PATRICIO A. ALVAREZ as Municipal Treasurer of Escalante, Negros Occidental, respondents.

FACTS

The petitioner, Zonsayda L. Alinsug, was a regular employee of the municipal government of Escalante, Negros Occidental, holding a permanent appointment as Clerk III. On June 10, 1992, the newly proclaimed mayor, Rolando P. Ponsica, detailed her to the Office of the Mayor. On June 19, 1992, she absented herself from work after asking permission from the personnel officer but not from the mayor. On June 23, 1992, Mayor Ponsica issued Office Order No. 31 suspending her for one month and one day for “simple misconduct… which can also be categorized as an act of insubordination,” with forfeiture of salary and benefits. Alinsug filed a petition for injunction with damages in the Regional Trial Court, alleging the suspension was an act of “political vendetta” as her family supported the mayor’s rival. Mayor Ponsica and the Municipal Treasurer filed an answer through a private practitioner. The petitioner moved to have the answer expunged and the respondents declared in default, arguing that since they were sued in their official capacities, they should have been represented by the municipal legal officer, provincial legal officer, or prosecutor as provided by law. The respondents opposed, stating the municipality had no legal officer and that hiring a private counsel was justified, citing a prayer for moral damages. An Assistant Provincial Prosecutor later entered his appearance for the officials. The lower court denied the petitioner’s motion and subsequent motion for reconsideration, holding that the appointment of a municipal legal officer was optional and the municipality had not designated one.

ISSUE

1. Whether or not a private counsel may represent municipal officials sued in their official capacities.
2. Whether or not respondents had been in default on account of having filed their answer through a private counsel.

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition. On the first issue, the Court held that the respondents were not improperly represented by a private counsel. While Section 481 of the Local Government Code makes the appointment of a legal officer mandatory for provincial and city governments but optional for municipal governments, and limits the hiring of a private attorney to situations where the municipality is an adverse party to the provincial government or another municipality, these proscriptions do not necessarily extend to public officials sued in their official capacity. The Court cited precedents where representation by private counsel was sanctioned, such as when rigid adherence to the law could deprive a party of redress, or when the complaint contains allegations and a prayer for moral damages, which, if awarded, must be satisfied by the defendants in their private capacity. The Court noted that a public official acting in an ultra vires manner may incur personal liability, justifying representation by a counsel of his own choice, with legal fees for his own account. On the second issue, since the representation by private counsel was proper, the respondents were not in default for having filed their answer through such counsel. The lower court was directed to proceed with the resolution of the case.