G.R. Nos. 108172-73. January 9, 1995.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CONRADO LUCAS Y BRIONES, accused-appellant.

FACTS

In a decision promulgated on May 25, 1994, the First Division modified the penalty imposed on the accused-appellant for the crime of rape. The trial court had originally sentenced him to reclusion perpetua. The First Division, however, opined that since Republic Act No. 7659 fixed the duration of reclusion perpetua at twenty years and one day to forty years, Article 65 of the Revised Penal Code could be applied to divide this range into three periods. Consequently, it modified the penalty to “34 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion perpetua.”
The appellee filed a motion for clarification, requesting a correction in the computation of the maximum period stated in the decision. More significantly, the motion raised the fundamental issue of whether the amendment by R.A. No. 7659 converted reclusion perpetua into a divisible penalty. Considering the importance of this issue of first impression, the First Division referred the motion to the Court en banc.

ISSUE

Whether Republic Act No. 7659 , by specifying a duration for reclusion perpetua, converted it from an indivisible penalty into a divisible one subject to periods for graduated application.

RULING

The Court en banc ruled that reclusion perpetua remains an indivisible penalty. The legislative history of R.A. No. 7659 reveals no clear intent to alter its fundamental nature. The original Senate version sought to create a new penalty of “life imprisonment” (30 years and 1 day to 40 years) to sit between reclusion perpetua (20 years and 1 day to 30 years) and death, thereby forming a three-grade scheme for heinous crimes. However, the Bicameral Conference Committee eliminated “life imprisonment” and simply extended the duration of the existing penalty of reclusion perpetua to 20 years and 1 day to 40 years to accommodate the need for a higher penalty grade.
Senator Arturo Tolentino, the sponsor, explicitly stated that the extension of the range was merely to achieve a “flexible reclusion perpetua,” not to divide it into periods. The Court held that specifying a duration does not automatically make a penalty divisible; divisibility requires a legislative declaration that the penalty is composed of distinct periods. Since no such intent was found, reclusion perpetua retains its character as an indivisible penalty. Therefore, the Court set aside the First Division’s application of Article 65 and reinstated the penalty of reclusion perpetua as a single, indivisible penalty imposed by the trial court.