GR 106719; (September, 1993) (Digest)
G.R. No. 106719 September 21, 1993
DRA. BRIGIDA S. BUENASEDA, LT. COL. ISABELO BANEZ, JR., ENGR. CONRADO REY MATIAS, MS. CORA S. SOLIS and MS. ENYA N. LOPEZ, petitioners, vs. SECRETARY JUAN FLAVIER, OMBUDSMAN CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, and NCMH NURSES ASSOCIATION, represented by RAOULITO GAYUTIN, respondents.
FACTS
Petitioners, officials of the National Center for Mental Health (NCMH), filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus to nullify the Order dated January 7, 1992, of the Ombudsman directing their preventive suspension. The order was issued in connection with an administrative complaint (OBM-ADM-0-91-0151) filed by the private respondent, NCMH Nurses Association, for alleged violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Petitioners alleged the order was issued without affording them an opportunity to controvert the charges and sought the disqualification of specific Ombudsman officials for partiality. The Supreme Court issued a status quo order on September 22, 1992, which petitioners later moved to enforce against the Secretary of Health, who was allegedly refusing to comply. The Solicitor General supported petitioners’ position that the Ombudsman’s order should be held in abeyance. A motion for disbarment and contempt was filed by the private respondent against petitioners’ lawyers for allegedly inducing petitioners to defy the suspension order.
ISSUE
Whether the Ombudsman has the power to directly order the preventive suspension of government officials and employees working in offices other than the Office of the Ombudsman, pending the investigation of administrative complaints.
RULING
Yes. The Supreme Court upheld the power of the Ombudsman under Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6770 to preventively suspend any officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation, provided the evidence of guilt is strong and the specified conditions (involving dishonesty, oppression, grave misconduct, neglect, warranting removal, or where continued stay may prejudice the case) are met. The Court distinguished this preventive suspension from the punitive suspension mentioned in Section 13(3), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution . The constitutional provision refers to “suspension” as a final penalty (associated with removal, demotion, fine, censure), while the preventive suspension under R.A. No. 6770 is a procedural measure to aid an investigation. The power to impose preventive suspension is encompassed within the constitutional grant to the Ombudsman to “exercise such other powers or perform such functions or duties as may be provided by law” under Section 13(8). The Court found the Solicitor General’s argument—that the Ombudsman could only recommend suspension—to be inapplicable as it pertained to punitive, not preventive, suspension.
