G.R. No. 104960 September 14, 1993
PHILIP G. ROMUALDEZ, petitioner, vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 7, TACLOBAN CITY, DONATO ADVINCULA, BOARD OF ELECTION INSPECTORS, PRECINCT No. 9, MALBOG, TOLOSA, LEYTE, and the MUNICIPAL REGISTRAR COMELEC, TOLOSA, LEYTE, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Philip G. Romualdez, a natural-born Filipino citizen, established his residence in Barangay Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte in the early 1980s, constructing a house there and serving as Barangay Captain. He voted in Leyte in the 1984 Batasan and 1986 “snap” Presidential elections. Following the EDSA People Power Revolution in February 1986, Romualdez, fearing for his safety, left the Philippines with his family and was granted asylum in the United States. In September 1991, he received a letter from U.S. immigration authorities requiring him to depart by August 1992. He returned to the Philippines in December 1991 and promptly went to his residence in Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte. On February 1, 1992, he registered anew as a voter at Precinct No. 9 in Malbog. Private respondent Donato Advincula filed a petition with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Tolosa to exclude Romualdez from the voter list, alleging he was a resident of Massachusetts, USA, and lacked the required one-year residence in the Philippines and six-month residence in Tolosa. The MTC denied the petition, finding Romualdez a qualified resident voter. On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) reversed the MTC, disqualifying Romualdez and ordering the cancellation of his voter registration. Romualdez filed this special civil action for certiorari.

ISSUE

1. Whether the MTC and RTC acquired jurisdiction over the exclusion case despite the petitioner’s claim that Advincula’s petition did not allege he was a registered voter of the municipality.
2. Whether the respondent court erred in finding that the petitioner voluntarily left the country and abandoned his residence in Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte.

RULING

1. On the first issue, the Supreme Court ruled that the petitioner is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the courts. While lack of jurisdiction may be assailed at any stage, a party’s active participation in the proceedings without raising the issue of jurisdiction, and more importantly, seeking affirmative relief from the court (as Romualdez did by praying for the affirmation of the MTC decision in his RTC appeal memorandum), estops him from later assailing such jurisdiction. The matter of the complainant’s locus standi was considered foreclosed at that stage.
2. On the second and primordial issue, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioner, reversing the RTC decision. The Court held that domicile and residence are synonymous in election law, requiring intention to reside in a fixed place and conduct indicative of such intention. Romualdez established his domicile in Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte in the early 1980s. His departure after the 1986 revolution was due to well-founded apprehension for his and his family’s safety and was not voluntary in the context of abandoning domicile. There was no convincing evidence that he intended to abandon his Philippine residence and establish a new domicile elsewhere. His stay in the U.S. was a form of involuntary exile or self-exile, and he promptly returned to his residence upon his return to the Philippines. Therefore, he did not lose his domicile of origin/choice in Tolosa, Leyte.
The Supreme Court GRANTED the petition, REVERSED and SET ASIDE the RTC decision, REINSTATED the MTC decision, and made the Temporary Restraining Order permanent. No costs.