G.R. No. 104782 March 30, 1993
NELY T. RASPADO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, Third Division, VICENTE ONG, PEDRITO JACOB, JR., JOSEFINA TABONES, ALFREDO VILLERO, MANUEL JAPSON, BALTAZAR RIZO and NICOLAS CASUL, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Nely T. Raspado filed a complaint for recovery of possession (accion publiciana) with preliminary mandatory injunction and damages against private respondents before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. She alleged she was the owner of a parcel of land in Intramuros, Manila, covered by TCT No. 194183, having acquired it from the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila by an Absolute Deed of Sale dated August 7, 1990. She claimed that sometime in 1986, private respondents surreptitiously entered the property and built shanties, thereby illegally depriving her and her predecessor-in-interest of possession since 1986. Private respondents, in their answer, denied the allegations, asserted that the complaint stated no cause of action, and claimed Raspado was not a real party in interest as the real owner was her common-law husband, an alien disqualified from owning land. They also claimed a right of first refusal as lawful occupants for over twenty-five years, challenged the validity of the barangay certification, and denied receiving any prior demand to vacate. The trial court granted Raspado’s motion for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. The Court of Appeals set aside this order, ruling that the motion for reconsideration filed by Raspado in the CA was deemed abandoned when she filed the instant petition without waiting for its resolution. The appellate court found the injunction improper as it altered, rather than preserved, the status quo, since private respondents were in possession before Raspado acquired the property in 1990, and Raspado failed to demonstrate a clear right to possession pendente lite.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in setting aside the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issued by the trial court.

RULING

No, the Court of Appeals did not commit grave abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court’s decision, denying the petition for lack of merit. The Court held that a preliminary mandatory injunction is an extraordinary remedy that may issue pendente lite only in cases of extreme urgency where the right to possession during the pendency of the case is very clear. The guidelines from Merville Park Homeowners Association vs. Velez require that the injunction should re-establish a pre-existing relationship recently interrupted, not establish a new one. The Court found that the injunction issued by the trial court went beyond maintaining the status quo. Private respondents were in possession of the premises before the property was sold to Raspado in 1990 (since at least 1986, by her own admission). Therefore, the status quo favored the private respondents’ continued possession until the main action was resolved. Raspado failed to demonstrate a clear right to possession pendente lite, as the private respondents’ defenses, if proven, could lead to the dismissal of the complaint. Furthermore, there was no evidence of a willful and unlawful invasion of Raspado’s rights, as she admitted she had no knowledge of how the private respondents entered the property. The effect of the injunction would have been to dispose of the main case without a full trial.