G.R. No. 104709. March 7, 1995.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF LANAO DEL NORTE, BRANCH V, and CASAN MAQUILING, respondents.

FACTS

Private respondent Casan Maquiling was convicted of homicide and serious physical injuries by the Regional Trial Court. On the day of the conviction, September 25, 1991, he filed a Notice of Appeal and a Motion to Fix Bail. Two days later, on September 27, he filed a Motion to Withdraw his Notice of Appeal, stating his desire to instead file a Motion for Reconsideration. The trial court granted the withdrawal on September 30. Subsequently, on October 7, still within the 15-day appeal period, Maquiling filed his Motion for Reconsideration.
The trial court, however, in its October 29 order, declared its judgment final and executory, reasoning that the withdrawal of the appeal constituted a waiver of the right to appeal under Rule 122, Section 12 of the Rules of Court. It granted the prosecution’s motion for execution and refused to act on the pending Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Fix Bail. Maquiling escaped from prison on November 11, 1991, but later surrendered on March 25, 1992, after the Court of Appeals had already rendered a decision favorable to him.

ISSUE

The main issues were: (1) whether Maquiling should still be allowed to appeal after withdrawing his notice of appeal; and (2) what effect his escape had on his right to appeal.

RULING

The Supreme Court ruled against the People and affirmed the Court of Appeals. On the first issue, the Court held that the trial court erred in declaring the judgment final. The withdrawal of the notice of appeal was not a clear and unequivocal waiver of the right to appeal. The motion to withdraw explicitly stated it was to allow the filing of a motion for reconsideration, which is a legitimate step before an appeal. Since the motion for reconsideration was filed within the reglementary period, the judgment had not attained finality. The right to appeal should be respected in the interest of substantial justice, especially given the gravity of the offenses.
On the second issue, the Court ruled that Maquiling’s escape did not constitute a waiver of his right to appeal. His subsequent voluntary surrender before the trial court could act on his motion for reconsideration demonstrated that he did not abandon his intention to challenge the conviction. Escape, while condemnable, is not per se a waiver of appeal unless a clear intent to abandon is shown, which was not present here. The Court also found no merit in the Solicitor General’s claim of being denied due process, as the Court of Appeals had duly furnished him a copy of the petition and he had filed a motion for extension instead of a comment. The petition was denied.