GR 102918; (March, 1993) (Digest)
G.R. No. 102918. March 30, 1993.
JOSE V. NESSIA, petitioner, vs. JESUS M. FERMIN and MUNICIPALITY OF VICTORIAS, NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Jose V. Nessia, then Deputy Municipal Assessor of Victorias, Negros Occidental, filed a complaint for damages and reimbursement of expenses against respondent Mayor Jesus M. Fermin and the Municipality of Victorias. Nessia alleged that Mayor Fermin deliberately ignored and refused to act on his vouchers for reimbursement of travel expense allowances because Nessia defied Fermin’s request for municipal officials to register and vote in Victorias in the 1980 local elections. Fermin countered that the claims could not be approved as they exceeded budgetary appropriations. The Municipality of Victorias, declared in default for non-appearance at pre-trial, concurred with Fermin’s arguments. The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of Nessia, finding Fermin liable for maliciously refusing to act on the vouchers. Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the trial court and dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action, holding that the evidence and the complaint itself did not establish unjust inaction. Nessia elevated the case to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE
The primary issue is whether respondent Mayor Jesus M. Fermin maliciously refused to act on petitioner’s vouchers, making him liable for damages under Article 27 of the Civil Code. A secondary issue is whether the dismissal of the complaint by the Court of Appeals absolved the Municipality of Victorias from liability despite its failure to appeal the trial court’s decision.
RULING
The Supreme Court GRANTED the petition, SET ASIDE the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals, and REINSTATED and AFFIRMED the decision of the Regional Trial Court. The Court held that the trial court’s finding that Mayor Fermin maliciously refused to act on the vouchers was entitled to greater weight, as it was based on its superior position to assess witness credibility and evidence. The Court found that the vouchers were received by Fermin’s office, and his inaction, despite follow-up letters, constituted unjust refusal to perform an official duty under Article 27 of the Civil Code. The defense of lack of appropriation did not justify malicious inaction, as official inaction is distinct from disapproval and brings the administrative process to a standstill. The Court also noted that such inaction could fall under Section 3(f) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Regarding the Municipality, the Court clarified that the dismissal of the complaint by the Court of Appeals did not absolve it, as it did not appeal the trial court’s decision, which had become final and executory against it. The trial court’s award of actual, moral, and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, and costs was reinstated.