GR 10202; (September, 1914) (Digest)

G.R. No. 10202; September 29, 1914

FACTS:
The Municipality of Cardona, Province of Rizal, filed a complaint styled as an action of quo warranto, alleging that the Municipality of Binangonan, also of Rizal, was unlawfully exercising jurisdiction over several barrios (Tatala, Balatik, Nambug, Tutulo, Mahabang Parang, Nagsulo, Sampad, and Bonot) which Cardona claims are within its territorial limits. The complaint further alleged that defendant L.R. Brown, a district engineer, was about to destroy ancient boundary monuments and erect new ones pursuant to Executive Order No. 66, series of 1914, issued by the Governor-General. This executive order, authorized under Act No. 1748, effectively altered the municipal boundaries to include the disputed barrios within Binangonan.

Cardona contended that the power to fix municipal territorial limits resides exclusively in the Legislature under the Philippine Bill and cannot be delegated. It argued that Act No. 1748, which authorized the Governor-General to issue such orders, was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. Additionally, Cardona claimed the executive order was void for failing to affirmatively state it was for the public benefit as required by the Act. The plaintiffs prayed for a judgment declaring Binangonan an illegal usurper of municipal powers over the barrios and for a preliminary injunction to restrain Engineer Brown from proceeding with the boundary changes.

ISSUE:
Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the issuance of a preliminary injunction based on the allegations in their complaint.

RULING:
No, the plaintiffs are not entitled to a preliminary injunction. The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Moreland, denied the motion for a preliminary injunction.

The Court held that the complaint failed to meet the statutory requirements for issuing a preliminary injunction under Sections 164 and 166 of the Code of Civil Procedure. A preliminary injunction requires, among other things, a showing that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded. The Court examined the sufficiency of the complaint insofar as it related to the requested injunctive relief.

Critically, the Court found that the action was not a proper quo warranto proceeding under the relevant sections of the Code of Civil Procedure. An action of quo warranto applies to situations where a person or corporation usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office or franchise. It is designed to address a complete lack of title to the office or franchise itself.

In this case, the defendant Municipality of Binangonan is a duly constituted municipal corporation. The dispute did not concern Binangonan’s very right to exist or exercise municipal powers generally, but rather the alleged excess in the exercise of its jurisdiction by claiming authority over territory beyond its proper limits. The Court ruled that an action of quo warranto is not the appropriate remedy for a mere dispute over territorial boundaries between two existing corporations. The proper remedy, if the boundary changes were illegal, would be an action for permanent injunction, not quo warranto.

Since the complaint, framed as a quo warranto action, did not establish a clear legal right to the ultimate relief sought, the prerequisite for granting a preliminary injunction was not satisfied. The motion was therefore denied. The Court did not rule on the substantive constitutional questions regarding the delegation of legislative power, as the denial was based solely on the procedural inappropriateness of the action and the consequent failure to justify preliminary injunctive relief.