GR 101683; (February, 1995) (Digest)
G.R. No. 101683 February 23, 1995
LBC AIR CARGO, INC., FERNANDO M. YU and JAIME TANO, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Fourth Division, SHERWIN MONTEROLA y OYON-OYON, represented by PATROCENIA GRONDIANO y MONTEROLA, and PATROCENIA GRONDIANO y MONTEROLA, respondents.
FACTS
On November 15, 1987, Rogelio Monterola was driving his motorcycle on the right lane of a dusty national road in Bislig, Surigao del Sur. Simultaneously, an LBC cargo van driven by Jaime Tano, Jr., with passengers Fernando Yu (LBC Manager) and his son, was traveling from the opposite direction. Tano stopped his van upon seeing two vehicles racing towards him from the opposite lane, which stirred a cloud of dust causing extremely poor visibility. Instead of waiting for the dust to settle, Tano proceeded to make a sharp left turn towards the airport road. As his van reached the center of the right lane, Monterola’s motorcycle suddenly emerged from the dust and collided head-on with the right side of the van, resulting in Monterola’s fatal injuries. A criminal case for homicide through reckless imprudence and a civil case for damages were filed against Tano, Yu, and LBC. The trial court dismissed both cases, ruling that the proximate cause of the accident was Monterola’s negligence. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision in the civil case, finding Tano negligent and holding him and LBC jointly and severally liable for damages, reduced by 20% due to Monterola’s contributory negligence.
ISSUE
1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding Jaime Tano, Jr. negligent.
2. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the proximate cause of the accident was the victim’s negligence.
RULING
The Supreme Court AFFIRMED the decision of the Court of Appeals.
1. The Court upheld the appellate court’s finding that Tano was negligent. Despite admitting to extremely poor visibility due to dust, Tano made a left turn without first ensuring the movement could be made safely and without giving a plainly visible signal to approaching vehicles, as required by the Land Transportation and Traffic Code (Sec. 44, R.A. 4136). This reckless act created the condition of danger that led to the collision.
2. The Court ruled that the proximate cause of the accident was Tano’s negligence, not the victim’s. The doctrine of “last clear chance” was not applicable because the incident occurred instantaneously, affording Monterola no appreciable time to avoid the collision after Tano swerved. However, the Court agreed with the appellate court that Monterola was contributorily negligent for driving at a fast speed despite the dusty conditions, which justified the 20% reduction in the award of damages. The Court also affirmed that employer LBC Air Cargo, Inc. was vicariously liable for Tano’s negligence, but absolved Fernando Yu from liability as branch manager, finding no employer-employee relationship between him and driver Tano.