GR 101630; (August, 1992) (Digest)
G.R. No. 101630 August 24, 1992
VICTOR DE JESUS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE EDDIE R. ROJAS, MTCC, Br. II, General Santos City, CITY PROSECUTOR FRANKLIN GACAL and SALUSTIANO SONIDO, respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Victor de Jesus, then Director and Finance Officer of Southern Island Colleges, together with his stepmother Eugenia de Jesus, was charged with violation of Section 28(h) of the Social Security Law for failure to remit the SSS loan amortizations of private respondent Salustiano Sonido, an employee, amounting to P583.35 covering January to August 1988. The Information was filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch II, General Santos City, presided by respondent Judge Eddie R. Rojas. Petitioner filed a motion to quash the Information on the grounds that: (a) the City Prosecutor lacked authority to file the Information without prior authority from the SSS; (b) the SSS, not the MTCC, has jurisdiction; (c) the criminal action was extinguished by the sale of his shares in the school before the complaint was filed; and (d) damage as an element of estafa was absent due to Section 22(b) of the Social Security Law guaranteeing employee benefits despite employer non-remittance. Respondent Judge denied the motion to quash on February 27, 1991. Petitioner challenged this Order via a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus before the Court of Appeals. On July 31, 1991, the appellate court dismissed the petition, holding that decisions of Municipal Trial Courts are not directly reviewable by it and that the petition should have been filed with the Regional Trial Court. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied on August 28, 1991.
ISSUE
The primary issue is whether the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus on jurisdictional grounds, holding that such petitions from Municipal Trial Courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court. Subsidiarily, the Court also addresses the merits of petitioner’s grounds for his motion to quash the Information.
RULING
The Supreme Court reversed the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated July 31, 1991, and August 28, 1991. It held that the Court of Appeals has original jurisdiction under Section 9 of B.P. 129 to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, and certiorari, concurrent with the Supreme Court and the Regional Trial Courts. The appellate court’s refusal to take cognizance of the petition was a procedural misconception, as its jurisdiction to issue such writs is not dependent on having appellate jurisdiction over the lower court’s decisions. However, as a matter of policy, direct recourse to the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals for such writs against a municipal court is generally discouraged; the initial relief should be sought from the Regional Trial Court. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court opted to resolve the merits of the motion to quash to avoid further delay.
On the merits, the Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the Order of respondent Judge denying the motion to quash, directing the trial to proceed. It ruled on each ground as follows:
1. Prior consent of the SSS is not essential for an employee to commence a criminal action under Section 28(i) of the Social Security Law, as the employee can institute criminal suits independently.
2. The SSS does not have jurisdiction to prosecute criminal offenses; Section 5 of the Social Security Law pertains to disputes over coverage, benefits, contributions, and penalties, not criminal prosecution, which must be sought in regular courts.
3. Criminal liability is personal and cannot be extinguished or transferred by the sale of petitioner’s shares in the school; liability attaches upon commission of the offense.
4. Damage is not an element of the offense under Section 28(h) of the Social Security Law, which punishes the failure to remit deducted contributions or loan amortizations within 30 days, creating a presumption of misappropriation punishable under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. This is distinct from ordinary estafa where deceit and damage are essential elements.
Other arguments not raised in the motion to quash were not considered, as no abuse of discretion could be ascribed to respondent Judge regarding them.
