G.R. No. 101557-58. April 28, 1993.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SPS. AMADO and TERESA RUBITE, petitioners, vs. HON. FILOMENO A. VERGARA, PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC, BR. 51, PALAWAN, and LEONARDO SALDE, SR., LEONARDO SALDE, JR., FLORESITA SALDE, GLORIA SALDE-PANAGUITON, and JOJETA PANAGUITON, respondents.

FACTS

On April 7, 1988, two Informations for frustrated murder (Crim. Cases Nos. 7396 and 7397) were filed against the accused-private respondents (Leonardo Salde, Sr., et al.) for allegedly conspiring to attack complainants-spouses Amado and Teresa Rubite. The accused were arraigned and pleaded not guilty. On September 19, 1988, the trial was suspended pending the accused’s motion for reinvestigation. The Provincial Fiscal resolved the reinvestigation in favor of the accused, finding the Rubites to be the aggressors and the accused acting in self-defense. On February 2, 1989, pending an appeal by the complainants to the Department of Justice, the Provincial Fiscal moved for the dismissal of the cases. On February 9, 1989, the Regional Trial Court granted the motion and dismissed the cases. On March 1, 1990, the Secretary of Justice ordered the refiling of the Informations. Consequently, on April 6, 1990, new Informations for the same offenses were filed (docketed as Crim. Cases Nos. 8572 and 8573). The accused again pleaded not guilty and then moved to quash on the ground of double jeopardy. On July 10, 1991, the trial court granted the motion and dismissed the new cases. The petitioners (the People and the Rubite spouses) filed this petition for certiorari, arguing that double jeopardy did not attach because the dismissal of the first cases was with the express consent of the accused (equated with their motion for reinvestigation), and that the dismissal order was null and void due to lack of notice and hearing on the prosecution’s motion to dismiss, violating due process. The Solicitor General concurred with petitioners, arguing the first jeopardy was not validly terminated.

ISSUE

1. Whether the accused-private respondents gave their express consent to the dismissal of the original Informations (Crim. Cases Nos. 7396 and 7397).
2. Whether the first jeopardy was invalidly terminated.

RULING

1. No, the accused did not give their express consent to the dismissal. Express consent is defined as that which is directly given either viva voce or in writing, requiring no inference. The accused merely moved for reinvestigation before the prosecutor. This act cannot be equated with express consent to the dismissal of the case in court.
2. No, the first jeopardy was validly terminated. The motion to dismiss filed by the public prosecutor, though lacking a notice of hearing, was granted by the court. The lack of notice did not invalidate the dismissal order, as the motion itself negated the necessity of a hearing since it was the prosecutor who instituted the case and later moved to dismiss based on reinvestigation results favoring the accused. The party who should invoke lack of notice is the one deprived of due process. The conditions for a valid defense of double jeopardy are present: (a) a first jeopardy had attached (valid information, competent court, plea entered); (b) the first jeopardy was validly terminated (dismissal granted); and (c) the second jeopardy was for the same offense. Therefore, double jeopardy lies.
The petition was DISMISSED for lack of merit.