G.R. No. 101428 August 5, 1992
DR. ISABELITA VITAL-GOZON, in her official capacity as MEDICAL CENTER CHIEF OF THE NATIONAL CHILDREN’S HOSPITAL, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and DR. ALEJANDRO S. DE LA FUENTE, respondents.
FACTS
Dr. Alejandro S. de la Fuente was the Chief of Clinics of the National Children’s Hospital (NCH). Pursuant to a reorganization under Executive Order No. 119, he was notified on February 4, 1988, of his reappointment to the lower position of Medical Specialist II. He protested this demotion to the Department of Health (DOH) Reorganization Board and, when ignored, to the Civil Service Commission (CSC). The CSC, in a Resolution dated August 9, 1988, declared his demotion null and void, ordered his retention as Chief of Clinics (retitled Chief of Medical Professional Staff), and directed payment of his back salaries and allowances. This Resolution became final on September 21, 1988, as no motion for reconsideration or appeal was filed.
Dr. de la Fuente sent letters to Dr. Isabelita Vital-Gozon, the NCH Medical Center Chief, demanding implementation. Dr. Vital-Gozon referred the matter to the DOH Legal Department but did not reply to de la Fuente or implement the Resolution. After three months with no action, and upon advice from the CSC that it lacked coercive powers, de la Fuente filed a petition for “mandamus and damages with preliminary injunction” in the Court of Appeals on December 28, 1988, to compel compliance. He later filed a “Supplemental/Amended Petition” for quo warranto and mandamus, adding Dr. Jose Merencilla, Jr., who was performing the duties of Chief of Clinics, as a respondent.
The Court of Appeals required the respondents to answer, but none was filed. The court resolved the case based on the petitions and annexes. On June 9, 1989, it granted the writs of mandamus and quo warranto, ordering Dr. Vital-Gozon to implement the CSC Resolution and Dr. Merencilla to cease and desist from performing the duties of the office. However, it denied de la Fuente’s claim for damages, ruling that a mandamus petition was not the proper vehicle for such a claim.
Dr. Vital-Gozon received the decision on June 15, 1989. She did not move for reconsideration or appeal. Instead, on June 20, 1989, she issued a memorandum implementing the decision, paying de la Fuente’s back salaries and allowances, and reinstating him. Subsequently, on July 17, 1989, she filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court, arguing that the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to award damages in a mandamus suit and questioning the Solicitor General’s authority to represent her regarding the damages claim.
ISSUE
1. Whether the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction, in a special civil action of mandamus against a public officer, to take cognizance of the matter of damages sought to be recovered from the defendant officer.
2. Whether the Solicitor General may represent the defendant public officer in the mandamus suit, in so far as the claim for damages is concerned.
RULING
1. On Jurisdiction for Damages: The Supreme Court ruled that the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to award damages in a mandamus case. The Court clarified that while a claim for damages is not a necessary component of a mandamus action, it can be joined as an incidental relief. The Court of Appeals’ original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, conferred by Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, includes the authority to determine all matters incidental to the grant of the principal relief. Since the claim for damages arose from the same act or omission that gave rise to the mandamus action—the refusal to obey a final CSC Resolution—it was properly joined. The Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the damages claim on jurisdictional grounds; it should have adjudicated it on its merits.
2. On Representation by the Solicitor General: The Supreme Court ruled that the Solicitor General may represent the public officer in the mandamus suit, including the aspect of the claim for damages. The Court distinguished between acts done by a public officer in the performance of official duties (which are official acts) and acts done in bad faith, beyond authority, or with grave abuse of discretion (which are personal acts). In a suit addressing both the official duty (compliance with the CSC order via mandamus) and the personal liability for damages arising from the unlawful refusal to perform that duty, the Solicitor General’s representation is appropriate. The refusal to obey a final order was an official act, and any resultant claim for damages was inextricably linked to that official conduct. Therefore, the Solicitor General was properly representing Dr. Vital-Gozon.
Dispositive: The Supreme Court DENIED the petition for certiorari. The Court of Appeals’ decision granting the writs of mandamus and quo warranto was affirmed. However, the portion denying the claim for damages was SET ASIDE, and the case was REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings to determine the merits of the claim for damages. Costs were imposed on petitioner Dr. Vital-Gozon.