GR 101107 08; (June, 1995) (Digest)
G.R. Nos. 101107-08. June 27, 1995.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROMEO BARROS y BALTAZAR, accused-appellant.
FACTS
On election day, May 14, 1984, accused-appellant Romeo Barros, a councilman and election watcher, sought to kill Vice-Mayor Gregorio Mapalo Jr. He first went to Mapalo’s house in the morning, and later, around 11:30 a.m., he was seen by multiple witnesses on the road near the Mapalo residence. Witnesses Reynaldo Gonzales, Isabelo Gonzales, and Mariden Milanes saw Barros fire three shots from a handgun toward the Mapalo house while shouting invectives, challenging the Vice-Mayor to come out. After reloading, Barros fired three more shots in the same direction.
Inside the house, Lydia Mapalo heard the shots and saw her son, Jojo Mapalo, fall face down, bleeding from a gunshot wound to the head. Jojo was pronounced dead at 2:15 p.m. from an intracranial hemorrhage. Police Chief Ricardo Fronda recovered a .38 caliber revolver, ammunition, and spent shells from Barros’s residence. Separate criminal cases for Murder and Illegal Possession of Firearm were filed against Barros.
ISSUE
The primary issue is whether the accused can be convicted separately for Murder and Illegal Possession of Firearm under Presidential Decree No. 1866 for a single act of killing, or if the law prescribes only one composite crime.
RULING
The Supreme Court modified the trial court’s decision. Applying the rule in People v. Tac-an, the Court held that when an unlicensed firearm is used in committing homicide or murder, the offense constitutes a single, indivisible crime of illegal possession of firearm in furtherance of the killing. The law (P.D. No. 1866, as amended) does not create two separate offenses but prescribes a special penalty for the use of an unlicensed weapon in the commission of another crime.
Therefore, the accused cannot be convicted of two separate crimes. The charge for Murder (Criminal Case No. A-1381) must be dismissed. The accused is guilty only of Illegal Possession of Firearm used in committing homicide under the second paragraph of P.D. No. 1866. The Court further ruled that the killing constituted homicide, not murder, as the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation were not proven. The intent to kill was directed at the Vice-Mayor, not the actual victim, and the shooting at the house was not a direct assault on a specific, defenseless individual, negating treachery. The penalty was imposed accordingly for the single composite crime.