GR 100594; (March, 1993) (Digest)
G.R. No. 100594 . March 10, 1993.
BINALBAGAN TECH. INC., and HERMILO J. NAVA, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, MAGDALENA L. PUENTEVELLA, ANGELINA P. ECHAUS, ROMULO L. PUENTEVELLA, RENATO L. PUENTEVELLA, NOLI L. PUENTEVELLA and NELIA LOURDES P. JACINTO, respondents.
FACTS
On May 11, 1967, private respondents, through Angelina P. Echaus as Judicial Administrator of the intestate estate of Luis B. Puentevella, executed a Deed of Sale for forty-two subdivision lots in favor of petitioner Binalbagan Tech., Inc. Binalbagan took possession and operated a school on the property. However, there was a pending case, Civil Case No. 7435, involving the same lots. In 1974, by virtue of a court order in a related case, Civil Case No. 293, Binalbagan was evicted from the lots and possession was given to third-party claimants. Binalbagan transferred its school to another location. On October 30, 1978, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision in Civil Case No. 293, and the judgment in Civil Case No. 7435 was finally executed in 1982, restoring Binalbagan to possession on May 31, 1982. Thus, Binalbagan was out of possession from 1974 to May 31, 1982. After being restored to possession, private respondent Echaus demanded payment from Binalbagan for the lots. As payment was not made, Echaus filed Civil Case No. 1354 for recovery of title and damages on October 8, 1982. The trial court dismissed the complaint, ruling that the action had prescribed. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision.
ISSUE
Whether private respondents’ cause of action in Civil Case No. 1354 is barred by prescription.
RULING
No, the cause of action is not barred by prescription. The prescriptive period for an action upon a written contract is ten years. The deed of sale was executed on May 11, 1967, and the action was filed on October 8, 1982, seemingly beyond the ten-year period. However, the period from 1974 to 1982, during which Binalbagan was evicted from the property, should be deducted. During this period, the seller’s warranty against eviction was breached, and thus, the seller was not in a legal position to demand payment from the buyer. The running of prescription was interrupted during this time. Deducting the eight years (1974 to 1982) from the total period (1967 to 1982) leaves only seven years elapsed. Consequently, the action was filed within the ten-year prescriptive period. The petition was denied and the decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed.