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GR 448; (September, 1901)

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G.R. No. 448

G.R. No. 448:September 20, 1901

THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appellee,

vs.
PHILIP K. SWEET, defendant-appellant.

Theofilus B. Steele, for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta, for appellee.

LADD, J.:

The offense charged in the complaint is punishable under the Penal Code now in force by arresto mayor and a fine of from 325 to 3,250 pesetas. (Art. 418.) By Act No. 136 of the United States Philippine Commission, section 56 (6), Courts of First Instance are given original jurisdiction “in all criminal cases in which a penalty of more than six months’ imprisonment or a fine exceeding one hundred dollars may be imposed.” The offense was therefore cognizable by the court below unless the fact that the appellant was at the time of its alleged commission an employee of the United States military authorities in the Philippine Islands, and the further fact that the person upon whom it is alleged to have been committed was a prisoner of war in the custody of such authorities, are sufficient to deprive it of jurisdiction. We must assume that both these facts are true, as found, either upon sufficient evidence or upon the admissions of the prosecuting attorney, by the court below.

Setting aside the claim that the appellant was “acting in the line of duty” at the time the alleged offense was committed, which is not supported by the findings or by any evidence which appears in the record, the contention that the court was without jurisdiction, as we understand it, is reducible to two propositions: First, that an assault committed by a soldier or military employee upon a prisoner of war is not an offense under the Penal Code; and second, that if it is an offense under the Code, nevertheless the military character sustained by the person charged with the offense at the time of its commission exempts him from the ordinary jurisdiction of the civil tribunals.

As to the first proposition, it is true, as pointed out by counsel, that an assault of the character charged in the complaint committed in time of war by a military person upon a prisoner of war is punishable as an offense under the Spanish Code of Military Justice (art. 232), and it is also true that under the provisions of the same Code (arts. 4, 5) the military tribunals have, with certain exceptions which it is not material to state, exclusive cognizance of all offenses, whether of a purely military nature or otherwise, committed by military persons. But the fact that the acts charged in the complaint would be punishable as an offense under the Spanish military legislation does not render them any less an offense under the article of the Penal Code above cited. There is nothing in the language of that article to indicate that it does not apply to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction of the law. Under articles 4 and 5 of the Code of Military Justice above cited a military person could not be brought to trial before a civil tribunal for an assault upon a prisoner of war, but by the commission of that offense he incurred a criminal responsibility for which he was amenable only to the military jurisdiction. That criminal responsibility, however, arose from an infraction of the general penal laws, although the same acts, viewed in another aspect, might also, if committed in time of war, constitute an infraction of the military code. We are unable to see how these provisions of the Spanish Military Code, no longer in force here and which indeed never had any application to the Army of the United States, can in any possible view have the effect claimed for them by counsel for the appellant.

The second question is, Does the fact that the alleged offense was committed by an employee of the United States military authorities deprive the court of jurisdiction? We have been cited to no provision in the legislation of Congress, and to none in the local legislation, which has the effect of limiting, as respects employees of the United States military establishment, the general jurisdiction conferred upon the Courts of First Instance by Act No. 136 of the United States Philippine Commission above cited, and we are not aware of the existence of any such provision. The case is therefore open to the application of the general principle that the jurisdiction of the civil tribunals is unaffected by the military or other special character of the person brought before them for trial, a principle firmly established in the law of England and America and which must, we think, prevail under any system of jurisprudence unless controlled by express legislation to the contrary. (United States vs. Clark, 31 Fed. Rep., 710.) The appellant’s claim that the acts alleged to constitute the offense were performed by him in the execution of the orders of his military superiors may, if true, be available by way of defense upon the merits in the trial in the court below, but can not under this principle affect the right of that court to take jurisdiction of the case.

Whether under a similar state of facts to that which appears in this case a court of one of the United States would have jurisdiction to try the offender against the State laws (see In re Fair, 100 Fed. Rep., 149), it is not necessary to consider. The present is not a case where the courts of one government are attempting to exercise jurisdiction over the military agents or employees of another and distinct government, because the court asserting jurisdiction here derives its existence and powers from the same Government under the authority of which the acts alleged to constitute the offense are claimed to have been performed.

It may be proper to add that there is no actual conflict between the two jurisdictions in the present case nor any claim of jurisdiction on the part of the military tribunals. On the contrary it appears from the findings of the court below that the complaint was entered by order of the commanding general of the Division of the Philippines, a fact not important, perhaps, as regards the technical question of jurisdiction, but which relieves the case from any practical embarrassment which might result from a claim on the part of the military tribunals to exclusive cognizance of the offense.

The order of the court below is affirmed with costs to the appellant.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Willard, and Mapa, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

COOPER, J., concurring:

I concur in the result of the decision of the court, but am not prepared to assent to all that is said in the opinion. An offense charged against a military officer, acting under the order of his superior, unless the illegality of the order is so clearly shown on its face that a man of ordinary sense and understanding would know when he heard it read or given that the order was illegal, and when the alleged criminal act was done within the scope of his authority as such officer, in good faith and without malice, and where the offense is against the military law — that is, such law as relates to the discipline and efficiency of the Army, or rules and orders promulgated by the Secretary of War to aid military officers in the proper enforcement of the custody of prisoners — is not within the jurisdiction of the courts of the Civil Government. (In re Fair, 100 Fed. Rep., 149.) The civil courts, however, may examine the evidence for the purpose of determining whether the act alleged to be criminal was done in the performance of duty under the circumstances above indicated, but should cease to exercise jurisdiction upon such facts appearing.

Batas Pinas

GR 64; (September, 1901)

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G.R. No. 64

G.R. No. 64:September 16, 1901

THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appellee,

vs.
VICENTE TAGUIBAO, defendant-appellant.

Lorenzo Alberto, for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta, for appellee.

TORRES, J.:

On the morning of May 27 of the current year Vicente Taguibao, Francisco Bancut, and Pedro Bancut went to a place called “Buquid,” in the town of Iguid. Taguibao, upon seeing Matias Paguiam engaged in plowing a piece of land which was the subject-matter of a dispute between Pedro Bancut and Vicente Gamat, immediately attacked Paguiam, inflicting blows upon his neck with the back of the bolo. The weapon used was shown by competent testimony to be of a class which it was permissible to carry. As a result of these blows Paguiam, who defended himself with his hands, received two slight wounds, before the combatants were separated by the bystanders, who subsequently testified in the case.

The facts stated do not constitute the crime of frustrated homicide, as they have been classified by the court below in the judgment under review, but merely a misdemeanor against the person, prohibited and penalized in article 589, No. 1, of the Penal Code. The accused did, it is true, attack the complaining witness, and struck him upon the neck with a bolo, but the fact that the blows were delivered with the back of the weapon is sufficient to preclude the assault’s being classed as frustrated homicide. It does not appear that the accused intended to cause the death of Matias Paguiam. All he did was to beat him with the back of the bolo.

In thus classifying an act according to the purpose of the accused, it is absolutely necessary that the homicidal intent be evidenced by adequate acts which at the time of their execution were unmistakably calculated to produce the death of the victim, since the crime in question is one in which, more than in any other case, the penal law is based upon the material results produced by the criminal act. It is not proper or just to attribute to the delinquent a specific intent to commit the higher crime in the absence of proof to justify such a conclusion.

In the present case it can not be inferred the accused intended to kill Matias Paguiam. He did not strike him with the cutting edge of the bolo. Consequently the assault committed by him does not constitute the crime of frustrated homicide, and the defendant should be acquitted. However, as the facts proved establish an offense necessarily included in that which was the subject-matter of the complaint, the offense committed should be punished by imposing upon the guilty party the corresponding penalty. The judgment of the court below is reversed and Vicente Taguibao y Calimaran acquitted with the costs de oficio. The defendant is condemned to the penalty of five days of arresto menor and to pay a fine of 125 pesetas, or in default thereof its equivalent in subsidiary imprisonment. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Cooper, Willard, Ladd, and Mapa, JJ., concur.

Batas Pinas

GR 18; (September, 1901)

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G.R. No. 18

G.R. No. 18:September 12, 1901

GAUDENCIO ELEIZEGUI, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JOSEFA AREVALO, defendant-appellant.

Emilio Gaudier, for appellant.
Alfredo Chicote, for appellee.

WILLARD, J.:

This case was initiated and carried on in reliance on the provisions of article 395 of the Mortgage Law. The article referred to applies only to cases in which the proprietor does not have a written title of ownership. The applicant holds a written title to the property described in his petition. Therefore he can not invoke the article referred to for the purpose of registering his ownership.

Article 437 of the General Regulations (Reglamento General) can not be invoked by the petitioner, since said article applies only to the registration of possession. It appears in the present case, moreover, that the written document evidencing the title of the petitioner was submitted to the court below attached to the petition.

The judgment appealed from should therefore be reversed. It is so ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Cooper, Mapa, and Ladd, JJ., concur.

Batas Pinas

GR 100; (September, 1901)

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G.R. No. 100

G.R. No. 100:September 9, 1901

AGUSTIN ASENCIO, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
FRANCISCO GUTIERREZ, defendant-appellee.

Jose Robles Lahesa, for appellant.
Vicente Miranda, for appellee.

WILLARD, J.:

It has been plainly proven that at the time this declarative action was initiated the defendant resided at Manila, P.I. He left Iloilo with his family November 19, 1898, and his family has never since returned to Iloilo. The defendant was at this latter place from February 17, 1899, until March 16 of the same year with the object, as alleged by him, of recovering the possession of his printing machine, which the American authorities refused to deliver. With this exception the defendant and family have resided permanently at Manila since they left Iloilo in November, 1898.

On April 1, 1899, a registration certificate was issued to him as a resident citizen of Manila. On January 1, 1900, his name was registered in the books of the Internal-Revenue Collector as a resident of Manila. On April 11, 1900 he presented a declaration to the Spanish consulate under article 9 of the treaty of Paris, in which he also stated that he was a resident of Manila. The plaintiff alleges in his complaint that the defendant is a resident of Manila; he also affirms this in his petition of November 20, 1900. it appears from the foregoing facts that it was the deliberate intention of the defendant to change his place of residence.

No law has been cited, in force in these Islands, which requires citizens to announce their intention of changing their residence in a more public manner.

It is expressly alleged in the complaint that the original lease expired on the 1st of April, 1899. The right alleged by the plaintiff in his complaint is based exclusively upon two facts. The first is, that after the aforesaid lease had expired and after all rent due thereunder had been paid according to the terms thereof, the printing machine, the property of the defendant, still remained in the basement of the house, which basement was only a part of the house described in the original contract of lease. The plaintiff in his complaint admits that the upper floor of the house was in use by him at the time he presented the complaint. The second is that a letter was written to the defendant May 17, 1899, advising him that the rent of the premises would be 150 pesos until the time the printing machine was removed from the building. The defendant did not answer this letter, but receipted for it at the post-office, as the letter was registered.

This action has been instituted with the object of collecting rent at the rate of 150 pesos per month from May 1, 1899, to the same month in 1900. The only question arising is this; Should this case be decided at Iloilo, where it originated, or at Manila? If there was a contract in this case it related only to the ground floor of the building and arises from the presence of the printing machine therein and from the letter of the plaintiff dated May 17, 1899. It was not stipulated in this letter where the payment should be made. In accordance with article 1574 of the Civil Code, article 1171 of the same Code is applicable, and the place of residence of the debtor is the place of payment. This personal action is, as affirmed by the plaintiff himself in his complaint, entirely distinct from and independent of an action of forcible entry and detainer. The rules which regulate the jurisdiction in such actions are not applicable to this case, which is governed by article 46, rule 1, of the Law of Civil Procedure now in force.

The order appealed from the Court of First Instance of Iloilo is in accordance with law and must be affirmed with the costs against the appellant. It is so ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Cooper, Mapa, and Ladd, JJ., concur.

Batas Pinas

GR 456; (August, 1901)

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G.R. No. 456

G.R. No. 456 : August 28, 1901

In the matter of the application of JOHN W. CALLOWAY for a writ of habeas corpus.

Eber C. Smith, for petitioner.
Colonel Grosbeck, United States Army, for respondent.

WILLARD, J.:

No judge of this Archipelago has at present jurisdiction to issue the writ of habeas corpus unless such jurisdiction has been conferred upon him by some legislative act. The only law now in force which confers such jurisdiction is General Orders, No. 58, amended by General Orders, No. 70, which latter order expressly denies this Supreme Court and other courts in the Philippine Islands the right to set at liberty any prisoner arrested in pursuance of military orders. Article 17 of “An act providing for the organization of court in the Philippine Islands” reads as follows:

The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, habeas corpus, and quo warranto in the case and in the manner prescribed in the Code of Civil Procedure, and to hear and determine the controversies thus brought before it, and in other cases provided by law.

The Code referred to in this article is not as yet in force, and therefore can not be applied to this case. It would appear from the answer to the writ that the petitioner has been arrested by virtue of military orders, such statement not having been objected to by the counsel for the petitioner. Therefore this court has no power to order the discharge of the petitioner.

The fact that the petitioner had been arrested in compliance with military orders was not set forth in the petition for the issuance of the said writ, and the court deemed it its duty to issue same in first instance.

Wherefore the writ issued August 23, 1901, is hereby repealed.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Cooper, Mapa, and Ladd, JJ., concur.

Batas Pinas

GR 17; (August, 1901)

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G.R. No. 17

G.R. No. 17 : August 26, 1901

DON LUCIANO CORDOBA, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
WARNER, BARNES & CO., defendants-appellees.

Alberto Barretto, for appellant.
Josiah Mode Vale, for appellees.

SMITH, J.:

This action was commenced in the Court of First Instance, Intramuros (Manila), by the plaintiff Cordoba, to recover from the defendants, Warner, Barnes, & Co., the sum of $479.57, Mexican currency, the value of certain merchandise alleged to have been short delivered by them as common carriers of the plaintiff, with 50 per cent of such value added as liquidated damages and also the costs of suit. In the court below judgment went for the defendants and plaintiff appealed.

The record discloses without contradiction that some time prior to June, 1900, the firms of Cahn, Nickelsberg & Co. and Trieste & Co. delivered at San Francisco, California, to the Pacific Mail Steamship Company on board its steamship Rio de Janeiro, for shipment to Manila via Hongkong, twenty cases of shoes and five cases of hats, respectively, freight prepaid as per “accountable receipt” or “way-bill.” The goods were consigned to plaintiff, Manila, and properly marked with his name. On arrival at Hongkong they were delivered by the Pacific Mail to the steamer Diamante in good condition, for transshipment to Manila Bay, at which place the vessel arrived June 11, 1900, under consignment to the defendants. Ten days later the five cases of hats and six of the twenty cases of shoes were discharged into the lighters of Carman & Co., agents of the plaintiff, empowered to receive and transport them from the ship’s side to the custom-house.

The court finds as a fact and the managing agent of the defendants positively testifies that before receiving the consignment of plaintiff, Carman & Co. called the attention of the defendants to the condition of the cases, and then and there protested their receipt on account of their “bad condition.” Nevertheless, the carrier, without verifying the contents of the packages and without demanding an examination of them on board, voluntarily delivered them to the lighter men who, under customs supervision and control, brought them to the custom-house, where they were deposited in the bodega set apart for broken packages.

On the 25th and 27th of June, 1900, and while the goods were still in the custom-house, the plaintiff wrote to the defendants, notifying them that the five cases of hats and the six cases of shoes bore evidence of having been tampered with, and asking that they name a representative to be present at the customs examination of the cases in order to note any shortage which might be disclosed thereby. Warner, Barnes & Co. named Señor Abren as their representative for the purpose, and he, conjointly with the customs officials, examined the cases in bad condition and reported to his principals that the packages were short 119 hats and 9 pairs of shoes. The merchandise found in the cases was received by the plaintiff from the custom-house some time subsequent to the 29th of June, 1900, on which date the duties were paid. Notwithstanding the report of their representative, the defendants declined to settle the claim presented for the missing goods, first, because the protested packages were not opened and examined before they left the ship’s side as required by the bill of lading, and second, because the claim of loss was not presented within twenty-four hours after delivery of the goods to the lighter for transportation to the custom-house. Both contentions of defendants were sustained by the court below in the suit which was subsequently commenced against them, and plaintiff appealed.

In our opinion neither one nor the other of the defenses set up by the consignees of the vessel was well founded. The bill of lading which provides that “in the event of any packages being refused on account of condition, they are, if in bad order, to be examined on board the steamer and contents certified to, when steamer’s responsibility will cease,” gave to the defendants the undoubted right to retain on board and to examine all refused packages. This right, however, being exclusively for their own protection, they could waive it and they did waive it by discharging the goods, notwithstanding the protest, and accepting a receipt which specified on its face that the cases were in “bad condition” when delivered for transportation to the custom-house. It lay wholly with the carrier to say whether the goods should or should not be discharged from the vessel without examination, and having voluntarily elected to so discharge them the respondents can not now be permitted to urge that the failure to examine the cases on board was a bar to the claim of appellant. If the goods had been examined on board the failure of the consignees to give the certificate of shortage prescribed by the bill of lading would have constituted no defense to the action, and on the same principle their failure to retain and examine the packages after protest made can not be held to prejudice the rights of the plaintiff.

Respondents claimed on the hearing of this appeal that the duplicate receipt offered in evidence by the appellants could not be accepted as evidence, for the reason that on its face it appeared to have been written in different inks and by different persons. If the duplicate receipt was fictitious or manufactured for the occasion it could have been shown in a moment by the production of the original delivered to the carrier when the goods were discharged, and the failure to do so by defendants must be considered against them and as fatal to their contention.

Defendants’ second defense that plaintiff’s suit must fail because his claim was not presented to the carrier or consignees of the vessel within twenty-four hours after receipt of the goods can not be sustained for the reason that plaintiff’s claim was presented not later than the 27th of June, 1900, and he did not receive his consignment within the meaning of article 366 of the Commercial Code before the 29th of the same month. The discharge of the merchandise into the lighters of Carman & Co. for delivery at the custom-house under customs supervision and control was not “the receipt of the merchandise” contemplated by article 366. The packages were then in the hands of the Government, and their owner could exercise no dominion whatever over them until the duties were paid or secured to be paid. The time prescribed by article 366 within which claims must be presented does not begin to run until the consignee has received such possession of the merchandise that he may exercise over it the ordinary control pertinent to ownership. For these reasons the judgment of the court below must be reversed without special finding of costs, and it is so ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Cooper, Willard, Ladd, and Mapa, JJ., concur.

Batas Pinas

GR 26; (August, 1901)

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G.R. No. 26

G.R. No. 26 : August 24, 1901

WALTER JACKSON, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
PAUL BLUM, ET AL., defendants-appellants.

Charles C. Cohn, for appellants.
WM. J. Rohde, for appellee.

COOPER, J.:

This is an appeal from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Intramuros (Manila) in an action for an accounting instituted by Walter Jackson against Paul Blum, H. Blum, W.A. Whaley, and L.M. Johnson. The matter involved is a leasehold interest in the business property known as the “Alhambra,” situated on the Escolta in Manila, together with the furniture and fixtures and other appurtenances.

In August, 1898, Señor Roca took a lease from the owner of the Alhambra and a short time afterwards transferred the same to Evans, Jackson, and Williams. Williams conveyed his interest to Evans and Jackson and the establishment was conducted by Evans & Jackson. The firm of Evans & Jackson, being in need of money, on the 21st day of October, 1898, made an arrangement by which the interest of Jackson in the property was transferred to Evans. In this transfer it was agreed that when the establishment was free from all incumbrances there should be a settlement between Jackson and Evans, and that Jackson should remain the owner of his interest in the property. On the same day Evans, being then the apparent sole owner of the establishment, obtained a loan from Paul Blum in the sum of 32,443 pesos, and in carrying out the transaction a partnership was formed between Evans and Whaley, and a conveyance, absolute in form, was then made by Evans & Whaley to Paul Blum, transferring to him the establishment, and a contract was also entered into between Evans and Whaley on the one part and Paul Blum on the other part, in which agreement it was recited that Evans & Whaley had borrowed from Paul Blum the said sum of 32,443 pesos and that they had executed to Blum the conveyance of the establishment mentioned. It was stipulated that Whaley was to be the managing partner of the firm of Evans & Whaley, Evans having the right to enter the premises at any time and to inspect the books of account. Each was to receive out of the business for his personal expenses the sum of 300 pesos per month. It was also agreed by Evans & Whaley to purchase from the American Commercial Company, of which Paul Blum was then a member, all supplies which they needed for the establishment. The loan made by Paul Blum to Evans & Whaley was to be paid off from the net proceeds of each day’s business, which were to be deposited with American Commercial Company to the credit of the Alhambra account, or to be paid from any other funds, with interest at the rate of 8 per cent per annum, and Evans & Whaley had the right to pay the whole or any part of the debt at any time to Blum and from funds other than the profits of the Alhambra. Whaley was mentioned in the instrument as representative of Blum. It does not appear, however, from the instrument that Blum was to be considered a partner or in any way interested in the business. Blum perhaps required that Whaley should become the managing partner of the firm of Evans & Whaley for the protection of his interests in advancing the money to them. No term for the duration of the partnership between Evans and Whaley was fixed, nor can any particular term be inferred from the nature of the business to be carried on by them. On the 13th day of November, 1899, a partnership settlement of the firm of Evans & Jackson was made between Evans and Jackson and the balance of $5,000 was found to be due from Evans to Jackson, and an agreement was then entered into between Evans and Jackson in which it was recited that the sum of 20,000 pesos was the estimated amount due on the mortgage of the property to Blum and that the equity of redemption was of the value of 40,000 pesos, which belonged to each of the partners in equal parts. In payment of the balance of 5,000 pesos due Jackson on the settlement of account, and in consideration of the sum of 5,000 pesos, Evans transferred all of his interest in the Alhambra property to Jackson. On the following day Evans applied to Blum to ascertain the amount due him on the mortgage, offering to pay the same. Blum refused to recognize Jackson as having any rights in the establishment. Afterwards Blum demanded of Evans & Whaley the payment of the sum of 28,000 pesos as due upon the mortgage, and Whaley, being then in exclusive possession of the property, turned over the same to Blum.

The judgment of the Court of First Instance was in favor of the plaintiff and an accounting was decreed. The contention of the defendants is: First, that by the sale from Evans and Whaley to Blum the property passed absolutely to Blum; second, that Evans could not substitute Jackson as debtor to Blum without the consent of the latter; third, that the partnership between Evans and Whaley was based upon confidence, and that Jackson could not be substituted as a member of the firm; fourth, that the juridical relation does not exist between the plaintiff Jackson and the defendants.

We shall briefly state the law applicable to the facts in the case: A partnership may be terminated by the will or renunciation of one of the partners, provided no term has been fixed for its duration or when a term is not fixed by the nature of the business. (Arts. 1700 and 1705 of the Civil Code.)

Personal or real property which each partner possesses at the time of the execution of the contract continues to be his private property, the usufruct only passing to the partnership. (Art. 1675 of the Civil Code.)

Each co-owner has the absolute ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits belonging thereto, and he therefore may sell, assign, or mortgage the same or substitute another in its enjoyment unless personal rights are involved. The effect of the sale or mortgage, however, so far as affects and co-owners, shall be limited to that portion which may be allotted to him in the distribution at the termination of the community. (Art. 399 of the Civil Code.)

No co-owner is obliged to remain in the community. (Art. 400 of the Civil Code.)

The judgment of the Court of First Instance is affirmed with costs on appeal taxed to the appellant.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Smith, Willard, and Ladd, JJ., concur.
Mapa, J., did not sit in this case.

Batas Pinas

GR 12; (August, 1901)

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G.R. No. 12

G.R. No. 12 : August 8, 1901

In the matter of the proceedings against MARCELINO AGUAS for contempt of the COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF PAMPANGA.

Claudio Gabriel, for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta, representing the respondents.

SMITH, J.:

It appears from the record in this matter that on the 29th of August, 1900, during the progress of a trial then being held before the Court of First Instance at Bacolor, in the Province of Pampanga, the court had occasion to caution Angel Alberto, a witness in the case, not to look at the attorney for the defendant but to fix his attention on the judge who was at the time examining him. It seems that the witness did not give heed to this warning, and the judge thereupon arose from his seat and approaching the witness, seized him by the shoulders, and using the expression, “Lingon ang mucha” (“Look at me”), either shook him, as insisted by the attorney for the defendant, or only turned him about, as claimed by the judge and others. Whether the witness was shaken or only turned about, at all events “seizing him,” brought the defendant’s attorney to his feet, who, protesting against the action of the judge as coercive of the witness, demanded that a record be made of the occurrence and that the further hearing of the case be postponed. Two days afterward the clerk entered in his record as recital of the incident substantially as above, and also a statement that on other and prior occasions the attorney, Marcelino Aguas, had been wanting in respect to the court by making use of “improper phrases,” and by interrupting opposing counsel in their examination of witnesses. The court on this record adjudged the attorney to be in contempt of court and suspended him from the practice of his profession for a period of twenty days. The attorney appealed, but his appeal having been disallowed by the lower court, he asked to be heard in justification, which was granted.

On the hearing in justification evidence was taken touching the contempt alleged to have been committed by Señor Aguas, from which the court found that during the trial of the case of Roberto Toledo vs. Valeriano Balatbat, the judge, having had occasion to seize the witness, Alberto Angel, by the shoulders to turn him around, Señor Aguas, attorney for defendant, had risen from his seat in a “menacing attitude,” and “with a voice and body trembling”protested that the action of the judge was coercive of the witness; and further that his attention being called to the fact that he was wanting in respect to the court and that he should sit down, he waived his right to go on with the trial and moved a postponement of the hearing. On this finding the court again adjudged the attorney guilty of contempt of court, and suspended him from the practice of his profession for a period of twenty days. From this judgment Señor Aguas appealed to this court.

In our opinion the action of the judge in seizing the witness, Alberto Angel, by the shoulder and turning him about was unwarranted and an interference with that freedom from unlawful personal violence to which every witness is entitled while giving testimony in a court of justice. Against such conduct the appellant had the right to protest and to demand were respectfully made and with due regard for the dignity of the court. The only question, therefore in this case is, Was the appellant respectful and regardful of the court’s dignity in presenting his objection and asking that it be recorded in the proceedings? The witnesses say and the judge finds that “his attitude was menacing” (bastante amenazadora) in the moment of making his protest, but beyond that there is nothing in the record which even tends to show that he was disrespectful to the court or unmindful of its dignity. In our opinion both testimony and finding state a mere conclusion which, in the absence of the facts from which it was deduced, is wholly valueless to support a judgment of contempt. The statement that the attorney’s attitude was “menacing” tended no more to competently establish the alleged offense of contempt than if the witnesses had testified and the court had found that his conduct was “contemptuous or lacking in respect.” The specific act from which it was inferred that his attitude was menacing should have been testified to by the witnesses and found by the court, and failing that, the record does not show concrete facts sufficient to justify the conclusion that he was disrespectful to the court or offensive to its dignity.

The judgment appealed from must therefore be reversed, and it is so ordered, with costs de oficio.

Arellano, C.J., Cooper, Willard, Torres, and Ladd, JJ., concur.
Mapa, J., did not sit in this case.

Batas Pinas

GR L 21671; (February, 1966)

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G.R. No. L-21671

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-21671; February 28, 1866

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF TAN HUY LIONG TO BE ADMITTED A CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES.
TAN HUY LIONG, petitioner-appellant,

vs.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellee.

Julio T. de la Cruz for the petitioner-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General for the oppositor-appellee.

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

Tan Huy Liong, a citizen of Nationalist China, came to the Philippines in 1916. On December 24, 1959 he filed a petition for naturalization with the Court of First Instance of Manila without previously filing a declaration of intention to become a citizen of the Philippines. The lower court found him to possess all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications for naturalization provided for in Commonwealth Act 473, as amended. Consequently, his petition was granted on October 21, 1960.

On October 6, 1960 he moved that he be allowed to take his oath as a Filipino citizen pursuant to Republic Act 530. The Solicitor General opposed the motion on the grounds that (1) the judgment granting Tan Huy Liong’s petition for naturalization is null and void because the applicant did not file a declaration of intention one year prior to the institution of the naturalization proceedings and that (2) applicant did not meet the required qualifications in paragraph 6, Section 2 of Commonwealth Act 473, having failed to enroll all his minor children of school age in any of the schools specified in the law.

Acting on the motion to take oath, the lower court found the following: Tan Huy Liong left the Philippines in 1918 and stayed in China for about a year. In 1925 he again went to China to get married. Every year from 1928 through 1941 he visited his family in China. In 1948 he once more visited his family in China and stayed for 10 months. From 1953 to 1960 he left the Philippines every year. His last trip abroad was in 1960, after he filed his petition for naturalization.

Said court, moreover, found that Tan Huy Liong has eight living children. Five of them entered the Philippines in 1947. One, a resident of Hongkong, came to the Philippines in 1957 only a temporary visitor. His two youngest children, minors at the time he filed the petition for naturalization, arrived in the Philippines in 1960 and since then have been residing with him here. Out of the eight children only one completed primary and secondary education here in the Philippines and one never studied here at all.

On February 21, 1963 said court declared Tan Huy Liong (1) not exempt from filing a declaration of intention for lack of the 30-year continuous residence prior to applying for naturalization and for failure to give all his children primary and secondary education in Philippine public schools or private schools recognized by the government not limited to any race or nationality, and (2) disqualified for naturalization due to his omission to enroll his minor children of school age in any of the public or private schools mentioned in paragraph 6, Section 2 of the Revised Naturalization Law. Accordingly, it denied the motion to take oath.

His motion for reconsideration and rehearing to present further evidence on the education of his children having been denied, the applicant brought the case to us on appeal.

As stated, Tan Huy Liong left the Philippines in 1960 after he filed his petition for naturalization. This constituted a violation of Section 7 of the Revised Naturalization Law and of his promise in paragraph 12 of his own sworn petition to reside continuously in the Philippines for the date of filing of said petition up to the time of his admission to Philippine citizenship.

From the records we likewise find applicant to have testified that during his stay in the Philippines he resided at 16 Felipe Segundo St., Manila (Tsn., p. 20), and later at his present residence in 1888 M. H. del Pilar St., Manila. In his petition for naturalization, however, he omitted to mention the former address — another violation of Section 7 of the Revised Naturalization Law.

In two previous cases we denied naturalization to applicants who left the country after the date of filing of their petitions for naturalization.1 And, in more numerous instances, we ruled that failure to state in the petition all the petitioner’s former places of residence is fatal to his application.2 Following said rulings, we are impelled to deny naturalization from the applicant in this case. The fact that the aforesaid grounds were not raised by the Solicitor General does not matter. Petitions for naturalization involve public interest; hence, on appeal, the entire record is open to scrutiny, whether objection is made or not.3

We deem it unnecessary to discuss the remaining issues.

Wherefore, the orders appealed from are affirmed and applicant is denied naturalization as a Filipino citizen. With costs. So ordered.

Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1Uytengsu vs. Republic, 95 Phil. 890; Bun Tho Khu vs. Republic, L-21828, January 22, 1966.

2De Lara vs. Republic, L-18203-04, May 29, 1964; Dy Pek Long vs. Republic, L-18758, May 30, 1964; Gaw Ching vs. Republic, L-19419, September 30, 1964; Ong Tai vs. Republic, L-19418, December 23, 1964.

3Kuan Kwock How vs. Republic, L-18521, January 30, 1964.

Batas Pinas

GR 83870; (November, 1989)

By
armztrong
-
0

G.R. No. 83870

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 83870 November 14, 10989

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
REYNATO ASUNCION and LEONARDO AGUINALDO, defendants-appellants.

The Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Maddela Law Office for Leonardo Aguinaldo.

Virgil R. Castro for defendants-appellants.

GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:

The appellants, Reynato Asuncion, a policeman and Leonardo Aguinaldo, a PC sergeant. were charged MURDER for the killing of Gregorio Vergara in Criminal Case No. 933 of the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya.

As may be gleaned from the People’s brief, the facts are as follows:

Gregorio Vergara was a member of the Catalina Intelligence Security Agency (CISA) in Canili, Alfonso Castañeda, Nueva Viscaya. On November 6, 1978, he was the officer-in-charge of CISA.

Reynato Asuncion was a member of the Integrated National Police (INP) of Pantabangan, Nueva Vizcaya, and Leonardo Aguinaldo was a member of the Philippine Constabulary (PC). Both of them were assigned with the 183rd PC Company detachment in Canili, Asuncion as officer-in-charge and Aquinaldo as a member of the detachment.

CISA provided the security services at the National Irrigation Administration (NIA). The CISA coordinated with the PC detachment in Canili, on matters concerning the security, peace, and order within the NIA compound.

At seven o’clock in the evening of November 6,1978, one Batung-malaki, property custodian of the NIA, requested Felomeno Sarmiento, security guard supervisor of the CISA in Canili, and appellants Asuncion and Aguinaldo to pacify a NIA security guard Eblacas and Rodolfo Tapat, a member of the CISA who were fighting inside the warehouse in Post No. 3 in the NIA compound. Batung-malaki, Sarmiento, Asuncion and Aguinaldo proceeded to the warehouse. Vergara followed them.

They met Eblacas who was bleeding. He told them that he had a fight with Tapat.

The group proceeded to Post No. 3 to look for Tapat. The guards there did not know where he was. However, the appellants suspected that Vergara was hiding him.

Except for Batung-malaki who remained at the main gate of Post No. 3, the group which included Bayani Agustin, brother-in-law of Aguinaldo, proceeded to the Transbasin Canal within the NIA compound. Before reaching the Transbasin Canal, Aguinaldo ordered the group to stop at a place covered with tall “talahib” grass. Aguinaldo ordered Sarmiento and Vergara to bring out their bullets. Sarmiento answered that they had no bullets.

Aguinaldo ordered them to bring out their gulls. Vergara obeyed.

Aguinaldo ordered him to throw his gun on the ground in front of him. After laying down his firearm, Aguinaldo kicked him.

Asuncion fired a shot upward. Aguinaldo fired at Vergara’s left leg and kicked his bleeding leg.

Vergara tied his wounded leg with a handkerchief He begged the appellants: “Huwag ninyo akong papatayin. Maawa kayo sa mga anak ko” (p. 24, Rollo). He requested Sarmiento to get an ambulance so he could be brought to the hospital.

Agustin embraced Sarmiento to stop him from getting an ambulance. But Sarmiento was able to extricate himself from Agustin’s embrace and left the place. In the meanwhile, the appellants had their guns pointed at Vergara who was seated.

Upon reaching Post No. 3 of the NIA compound, Sarmiento asked the guards, Presto and Martinez, to go and help Vergara, but they refused for fear that they might be sprayed with bullets. At that juncture, Sarmiento, Presto and Martinez heard a gunshot coming from the place where he had left the accused and Vergara.

Since the NIA’s ambulance was out of order, Sarmiento requested Presto and Martinez to inform Vergara’s wife about the shooting. Later that evening Perla Luz Vergara, accompanied by two (2) security guards went to the scene of the crime. They did not find Vergara at the place where he was shot. Following a trail of blood, they found him dead at the edge of a canal.

Vergara sustained two (2) gunshot wounds: one on the head (face) and the other on the left leg. He died immediately due to “hemorrhage, severe, secondary to gunshot wound at the head (face)” (p. 41, Rollo).

The next day, November 7, 1978, the appellants left Canili. Aguinaldo reported the killing incident to Major Juanita Flores of the 183rd PC Company at Baloc, Santo Domingo, Nueva Ecija. He said: “Nakabaril kami ni Asuncion, hindi ko alam kung patay” (p. 41, Rollo). Asuncion reported the incident to Sgt. Lorenzo Suelto.

A PC team was dispatched to investigate the crime. After the investigation, the appellants were required to surrender their guns to the PC Commander at Baloc, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija.

The appellants were charged with murder in the following information:

That on or about November 6,1978, at nighttime, in the Barangay of Canili, Municipality of Alfonso Castañeda, Province of Nueva Vizcaya, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused Reynato Asuncion and Leonardo Aguinaldo, Policeman and PC Sergeant, respectively, both attached to the 183rd PC Company, with abuse of their public positions as such police officer and PC Sergeant, with the qualifying circumstances of treachery, advantage of superior strength and aid of armed men and the generic circumstances of nocturnity and evident premeditation, and with intent to kill, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously mortally shoot with their service firearms (carbines) one Gregorio Vergara, on different parts of his body which caused his instantaneous death.

That as a consequence of the criminal act of the said accused, the heirs of Gregorio Vergara suffered actual, moral and exemplary damages in the amount of not less than Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00). (p. 3, Rollo.)

Upon arraignment, they pleaded “NOT GUILTY” to the charge.

On March 15, 1988, the trial court rendered judgment convicting both accused of the crime charged. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds both of the accused REYNATO ASUNCION and LEONARDO AGUINALDO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER defined and penalized under Article 248, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code.

The Court hereby sentences them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua; to jointly and severally indemnify the heirs of the late GREGORIO VERGARA the sum of P30,000.00 for his death and the additional sum of P15,000. 00 incurred for his burial.

Each of the accused shall pay his proportionate share of the costs. (P. 44, Rollo.)

The case was erroneously sent to this Court by the trial court for automatic review. Nevertheless, in a resolution dated April 3, 1989, the Supreme Court’s First Division, exercising its discretion to entertain appeals notwithstanding defendant’s failure to file a notice of appeal (Sec. 5, Rule 122, Rules of Court), resolved to review the case because of the gravity of the offense charged and the fact that appellants had already filed their brief (pp. 136-137, Rollo).

The appellants alleged that the trial court erred in finding that:

1. they committed the crime charged;

2. the crime was qualified by treachery and attended by the aggravating circumstance of “taking advantage of public positions;” and

3. the victim died of gunshot wounds.

As there was no eyewitness to the killing of Vergara, the conviction of the accused was based on circumstantial evidence only. Those circumstances are:

1. that the appellants harbored resentment against Vergara because they suspected him of concealing the erring CISA guard, Tapat;

2. that when Aguinaldo disarmed Vergara, Asuncion positioned himself with his gun ready to assist Aguinaldo should Vergara resist;

3. that Aguinaldo shot Vergara in the leg and kicked him, while Asuncion merely watched;

4. that when appellants were both armed with guns;

5. that when Sarmiento escaped to summon help, the appellants had their guns pointed at Vergara who was seated on the ground;

6. that the security guards at Post No. 3 refused to intervene because they knew that the appellants were in a black mood and they (the guards) were afraid of being shot by the appellants; and

7. that Aguinaldo admitted to Major Flores that he and Asuncion had shot (nakabaril kami) someone (p. 22, appellants’ ‘brief).

The combination of all the above circumstances is such as to produce the conviction of the appellants beyond reasonable doubt (Sec. 5, Rule 133, Rules of Court; People v. Modesto, 25 SCRA 36; People vs. Pajanustan, 97 SCRA 699).

There is also hardly any doubt that the appellants had acted in concert and assisted each other in killing Vergara on the fateful evening of November 6, 1978. Asuncion on acted as “backup” for Aguinaldo who fired the first shot that disabled their victim before the final kill.

Conspiracy having been established, the act of one is the act of both, hence, it is not necessary to ascertain their individual participation in the final liquidation of Vergara (People vs. Beltran, 138 SCRA 321; People vs. Garcia, 141 SCRA 336).

A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement to commit a crime and decide to commit it. While it is desirable that the conspiracy be proved by direct evidence, like an express ‘understanding among the plotters affirming their commitment and defining their respective roles, it may nevertheless be established at times by circumstantial evidence only. Thus, to repeat the established doctrine, where the accused move in concert toward a common purpose, conspiracy may be inferred from their joint acts and design, without need of direct evidence of the criminal agreement. We have held in many cases that the conduct of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime, are circumstances that can show whether or not there was a conspiracy among them. (People vs. Rojas, 147 SCRA 175; Emphasis supplied.)

The common defense of the appellants was an alibi, the weakest of defenses, Asuncion alleged that at the time of the killing, he was in the store of Villagracia around 10 meters away from the NIA gate and 100 meters from the scene of the crime (p. 34, Rollo). For his part, Aguinaldo alleged that after he had shot Vergara in the leg, he left the place to summon an ambulance and from there, he heard a gunshot coming from the scene of the crime (p. 35, Rollo).

This Court has consistently held that if the defense of alibi is to be believed, it must not only appear that the accused was at some other place but also that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime (People vs. Aquino, 133 SCRA 283).

The conflicting stories of the appellants at the trial, tending to impute responsibility for the crime on each other, not only proved that both of them are liars, but bolstered the prosecution’s theory that they were the perpetrators of the felony (p. 22, Appellee’s Brief).

Treachery qualifies the came as murder for as held by this Court in the case of People vs. Guardo (156 SCRA 152):

Although the attack was frontal, the crime committed was murder, qualified by treachery, as the accused employed means to insure the commission of the offense without risk to themselves from any defense the offended party might make.

We affirm the trial court’s finding that the aggravating circumstance of “abuse of public position” (p. 42, Rollo) was present in the commission of the crime (People vs. Alegarbes, Jr., 154 SCRA 125), for the appellants used their authority as members of the police and constabulary to disarm Vergara before shooting him. Unarmed and unable to flee because Aguinaldo had shattered his leg, Vergara was completely defenseless before his attackers. Treachery was present because his killers had employed means to insure the commission of the offense with no risk to themselves.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED, in toto, with costs against the appellants.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Medialdea, JJ., concur.


Batas Pinas

GR L 14874; (September, 1960)

By
armztrong
-
0

G.R. No. L-14874

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-14874; September 30, 1060

ANTONIO PEREZ, in his own representation and as Guardian Ad litem of his son BENIGNO PEREZ Y TUASON, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.

ANGELA TUASON DE PEREZ, defendant and appellee.

Alfonso Felix Jr. for appellant.

Jose W. Diokno for appellee.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Appeal from an order, dated October 27, 1958, of the Court of First Instance of Manila, dismissing its Civil Case No. 34626 for lack of jurisdiction.

Plaintiff Antonio Perez, in his own representation and as guardian ad litem of his adoptive son, Benigno Perez y Tuason, initiated this civil case against Angela Tuason de Perez, the plaintiff’s wife and Benigno’s mother. The complaint states three causes of action.

Under the first causes of action, it is averred that the defendant is squandering all of her estate on a young man by the name of Jose Antonio Campos Boloix, because of which Benigno Perez y Tuason, acting through his guardian ad litem, the plaintiff, prays that his mother, the defendant, be declared a prodigal and placed under appointed to administer her properties; and that during the pendency of this suit, a writ of injunction be issued to prevent the continued waste and disposition of her properties.

In his second cause of action, the husband Antonio Perez, for and his own behalf, asserts that by virtue of the said alleged acts of prodigality committed by the defendant wife, the conjugal partnership of gain is being dissipated to the prejudice of both spouses; wherefore, he prays for a writ of injunction to restrain her from “dissolving and liquidating the conjugal partnership of gains.”

Finally, as third case of action, the plaintiff husband avers that, in addition to the aforementioned acts, the defendants had repeatedly advised him, as well as other persons, that she intends to marry Jose Campos Boloix and to have a child by him not withstanding her present marriage to the plaintiff, Antonio Perez; and that, if she could not have such a child, she was willing to have one by any other person, just to put plaintiff in a ridiculous and embarrassing position. Plaintiff, therefore, seeks to recover from her the total sum of P185,000.00 by way of damages and attorney’s fees.

On January 2, 1958, after a preliminary hearing, wherein plaintiff was heard ex parte, the Court of First Instance of Manila issued a preliminary injunction as prayed for in complaint.

On March 19, 1958, the defendant appeared through counsel and prayed for the dismissal of the case on the ground of res judicata, and that the preliminary injunction be dissolve. Said motion was denied by the court a quo in its order of April 2, 1958.

On April 16, 1958, the defendant filed a second motion to dismiss the case, this time on the ground that the Court of First Instance of Manila had no jurisdiction over the present proceedings, which, according to her, is vested under Republic Act No. 1401 with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court. While this last motion was being considered by the Court, a compromise agreement was arrived at and submitted for approval of the court on May 2, 1958. On May 31, 1958, before the Court could act, defendant filed an opposition to the approval of the compromise agreement, on the ground that (a) the same is contrary to law and (b) it was not freely or validly entered into by her representative. Without resolving this particular question, the lower court asked the parties to submit further memoranda on the sole issue of jurisdiction. After this was done, the trial court, by order of September 30, 1958, ordered the dismissal of the case on the ground that it lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter. Hence, plaintiffs Perez (father and son) appealed.

Appellants assign three alleged errors in the order appealed from, as follows:

The trial court erred in holding that the Court of First Instance of Manila has no jurisdiction over the causes of action alleged by Antonio Perez in the complaint.

The trial court erred in holding that the Court of First Instance of Manila has no jurisdiction over the causes of action alleged by Benigno Perez y Tuason in the complaint.

The trial court erred in holding that the Doctrine of Estoppel of Jurisdiction is not applicable in this country and erred further in failing to apply said doctrine to the present proceedings.

We find the appeal to be untenable.

Republic Act no. 1401, creating the Juvenile Domestic Relations Court of the City of Manila and defining its jurisdiction, provides, among other things, that:

SEC. 38–A—Provision of the Judiciary Act to the contrary notwithstanding, the court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases after the effectivity of this Act:

(b) — Cases involving custody, guardianship, adoption, paternity and acknowledgment;

x x x x x x x x x

(d) — proceedings brought under the provisions of Articles one hundred sixteen, two hundred twenty-five, two hundred fifty, two and three hundred thirty-one of the Civil Code. (Emphasis supplied.)

While Article 116 of the Civil Code (referred to in subsection [d] above) states:.

When one of the spouses neglects his or her duties to the conjugal union or brings danger, dishonor or material injury upon the other, the injured party may apply to the court for relief.

The court may counsel the offended party to comply with his or her duties, and take such measures as may be proper. (Emphasis supplied.)

It is easy to see that the first cause of action set forth in the complaint, wherein the minor Benigno Perez y Tuason, through his representative, ask his mother be placed under guardianship because of her alleged prodigality, and prays that a suitable person or institution be appointed to administer her properties, is exclusively cognizable by the Domestic Relations Court. The action falls squarely under the provisions of subsection (b), Section 38-A, R.A. 1401, above-quoted, as a “case involving . guardianship.” No error was, therefore, committed in the appealed order in holding that this cause of action lay outside the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance.

The same thing can be said of the third cause of action wherein Antonio Perez seeks to recover damages and attorney’s fees because his wife’s act (avowing openly her intention to marry and have a child by Campos Boloix or if not, by anyone else) placed the plaintiff “in an embarrassing and contemptible position” (sic) and causing him “grave anxiety, wounded feelings, extreme humiliation.” The case involves acts of a spouse that “brings . . . dishonor . . . upon the other (spouse)” under Article 116 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, and also lies within the jurisdiction of the Domestic Relations Court. The law (subsection (d), Sec. 38-A) expressly gives that court exclusive original jurisdiction over proceedings under the provisions of Article 116 of the Civil Code.

More controversial is the issue involved in the second cause of action of the complaint, wherein Antonio Perez alleges that the prodigal acts of his wife result in the conjugal partnership of gains being dissipated to the prejudice of both spouses, and prays for a writ of injunction to restrain her from “dissolving and liquidating the conjugal partnership of gains.” The Court of First Instance held that this cause of action is also one of those provided by Article 116 of the Civil Code, as a case where one spouse “bring danger . . . or material injury” upon the other, and, therefore, relief should be sought in the Court of Domestic Relations.

We are inclined to think that “material injury” as used in Article 116 does not refer to patrimonial (economic) injury or damage, but to personal (i. e. physical or moral) injury to one of the spouses, since Article 116 lies in the chapter concerning personal relations between husband and wife. Nevertheless, the court below was correct in viewing this cause of action as primarily predicated on the grant of guardianship due to alleged prodigality of the wife, sine the allegation thereof is therein reiterated, and the remedy of injunction sought against further (i. e. future) acts of disposition (no annulment of her past transactions is demanded) must be necessarily based on the wife’s being subject to guardianship.

If the wife were not in any way incapacitated, the mere fact that the alienation of her paraphernal would deprive the conjugal partnership of the future fruits thereof would not give rise to a cause of action for injunction, since the conjugal partnership is only entitled to the net fruits of such property, after deducting administration expenses (People’s Bank vs. Register of Deeds, 60 Phil., 167), and it is nowhere alleged that any such net fruits exist. More fundamental still, the wife’s statutory power to alienate her paraphernal (Phil Civil Code, Article 140) necessarily implies power to alienate its future fruits, since the latter are mere accessory to the property itself.

WHEREFORE, the second cause of action is inextricably woven into and cannot stand independently of the demand for guardianship of the wife, injunction being a mere incident thereof; so that like the first cause of action, the second also lay within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Domestic Relations.

The third alleged error charged against the Court below, that it should have that defendant was in estoppel to question the jurisdiction of the trial court is, on its face, without merit. Assuming for the sake of argument that defendant appellee was placed in such estoppel by merely executing the compromise and submitting it to the Court’s approval, such estoppel could not operate against the Court. Regardless of the parties, the Court, at any time, could motu proprio inquire and determine whether it had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, and could dismiss the case (as it did) if it found that it had no power to act therein.

The order appealed from is hereby affirmed. Costs against appellants.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Gutierrez David, and Dizon, JJ., concur.

Batas Pinas

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