G.R. No. RTJ-06-2018 August 3, 2007
Office of the Solicitor General vs. Judge Antonio I. De Castro

FACTS

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed an administrative complaint against Judge Antonio I. De Castro of the Manila RTC. The complaint stemmed from the judge’s orders in a habeas corpus petition filed by James Mahshi on behalf of his wife, Chinese national Gao Yuan. Gao Yuan was arrested by the Bureau of Immigration (BI) pursuant to a deportation order, following a request from Chinese authorities alleging she was a fugitive from justice. Executive Judge Eugenio, Jr. initially issued a 72-hour TRO against her deportation. The case was then raffled to respondent Judge De Castro’s sala.
Judge De Castro extended the TRO for 17 days. Subsequently, he issued an order directing Gao Yuan’s release from BI custody upon the posting of a cash bond, citing humanitarian reasons as she was a nursing mother. The BI, through the OSG, refused to comply, arguing that jurisdiction over the alien’s release on bail was vested exclusively in the BI Commissioner under the Philippine Immigration Act. The judge then issued an interlocutory order taking provisional custody of Gao Yuan, releasing her under court-monitored conditions.

ISSUE

Whether respondent Judge De Castro is administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law for ordering the release on bail of an alien subject to deportation proceedings, despite settled jurisprudence vesting exclusive jurisdiction over such release in the Bureau of Immigration.

RULING

Yes, respondent Judge De Castro is guilty of gross ignorance of the law. The Supreme Court found that his order releasing Gao Yuan on bail was a blatant disregard of established law and jurisprudence. Section 37(e) of Commonwealth Act No. 613 explicitly grants the BI Commissioner the exclusive authority to determine whether an alien under deportation may be released on bail. This exclusive jurisdiction is a settled doctrine, firmly reiterated in Commissioner Rodriguez v. Judge Bonifacio.
The legal logic is clear: habeas corpus proceedings extend only to the determination of the legality of custody. If the detention is pursuant to a deportation order issued by the BI under its exclusive jurisdiction, the regular courts cannot interfere by granting bail or injunction, as this would usurp the executive function of the BI. By ordering Gao Yuan’s release on a cash bond he himself set, Judge De Castro effectively granted bail, an act beyond his judicial authority. His defense of humanitarian reasons does not excuse this fundamental legal error. A judge is expected to know such elementary and settled doctrines. His failure constitutes gross ignorance of the law, warranting administrative sanction. The Court suspended Judge De Castro for three months and one day without pay.