A.M. No. RTJ-03-1799, September 12, 2003
Maria Cristina Olondriz Pertierra vs. Judge Alberto L. Lerma, Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 256, Muntinlupa City

FACTS

Complainant Maria Cristina Olondriz Pertierra filed two administrative complaints against respondent Judge Alberto L. Lerma. The first, dated September 27, 2001, alleged gross ignorance of the law for granting her husband’s urgent motion to dispose of a Manila Polo Club share in their pending nullity of marriage case (Civil Case No. 99-266), which she claimed was her separate inheritance, and for failing to resolve her motion for reconsideration for over a year. She also accused the judge of bypassing the mandatory referral to the public prosecutor or Solicitor General as required by the Family Code, suggesting bias because her husband’s counsel was the judge’s “close golfmate.” The second complaint, dated June 20, 2002, charged conduct unbecoming a judge, bias, partiality, impropriety, and lack of integrity after she allegedly witnessed the judge having lunch and conversing with her husband’s counsel, Atty. Felisberto Verano, Jr., inside the courtroom shortly before a scheduled hearing.

ISSUE

Whether respondent Judge Alberto L. Lerma is administratively liable for conduct unbecoming a judge due to fraternizing with a lawyer who has a pending case in his sala.

RULING

Yes, the respondent judge is administratively liable. The Supreme Court found the charge of gross ignorance of the law premature, as there was no prior appellate finding of error or grave abuse of discretion regarding his questioned resolution. However, the Court held him liable for a light offense under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court for “fraternizing with lawyers and litigants with pending case/cases in his court.” The factual incident on June 19, 2002, where he was seen socially interacting with Atty. Verano, Jr., counsel for the opposing party in a case still pending before him, constituted conduct unbecoming a judge. While there was no showing of malice or bad faith, a judge must meticulously avoid any appearance of impropriety to preserve public confidence in the judiciary’s impartiality. His actions failed to meet the standard that a judge’s official and personal conduct must always be beyond reproach. Considering his subsequent inhibition from the case, which alleviated concerns of ongoing bias, the Court imposed the penalty of reprimand instead of a fine, with a stern warning that repetition would be dealt with more severely.