AM P 94 1089; (August, 1996) (Digest)
G.R. No. P-94-1089, August 22, 1996
Office of the Court Administrator vs. Vicente P. Librado, Deputy Sheriff, MTCC, Branch 1, Iligan City
FACTS
Respondent Vicente P. Librado, a deputy sheriff, was charged, convicted, and sentenced to six years of imprisonment for violating R.A. No. 6425 (The Dangerous Drugs Act) for selling and possessing methamphetamine hydrochloride and marijuana. The Office of the Court Administrator filed an administrative complaint following his criminal conviction. In his defense, Librado admitted the conviction but claimed he was now on probation. He narrated that he was induced by an acquaintance to procure and consume shabu, and a small remaining quantity was sold. He pleaded guilty due to personal hardships, including his wife filing for annulment and the demolition of his house. The Executive Judge investigating the case recommended a penalty short of dismissal, citing Librado’s probation status as an opportunity for rehabilitation.
ISSUE
Whether respondent’s conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude warrants his dismissal from the service despite his being placed on probation.
RULING
Yes. The Supreme Court ordered respondent’s dismissal. The legal logic is anchored on the nature of the offense and the standards for public office. Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is a grave offense under the Civil Service Law, punishable by dismissal for the first offense. Drug-pushing is unequivocally a crime of moral turpitude, described as a pernicious evil and an act of depravity that breeds other crimes, making the offender a merchant of death. Such conduct tarnishes the judiciary’s integrity.
The Court clarified that probation, unlike pardon, does not obliterate the conviction; it merely suspends the execution of the sentence. While probation aims to rehabilitate, it cannot justify retaining a person convicted of a morally turpitudinous crime in government service. Public office is a public trust requiring the highest moral standards. The reform of the probationer, while commendable, does not override the imperative to maintain public confidence in the judiciary. Thus, dismissal is the appropriate penalty to uphold the integrity of the judicial system.