A.M. No. P-05-2026, August 2, 2007
Virginia C. Hanrieder vs. Celia A. de Rivera, Court Interpreter, RTC, Branch 100, Quezon City

FACTS

Complainant Virginia Hanrieder filed an administrative complaint against respondent Celia de Rivera, a Court Interpreter, for Serious Misconduct, Willful Refusal to Pay Just Debt, and Conviction for an Offense Involving Moral Turpitude. The complaint stemmed from Criminal Cases where respondent was convicted with finality for fourteen counts of violating B.P. 22 (Bouncing Checks Law). The checks, issued in 1997 and totaling a significant amount, were dishonored. The Metropolitan Trial Court adjudged her civilly liable. Despite the final judgment, complainant failed to collect the debt. A writ of execution was unenforceable as the sheriff found no leviable assets, and respondent defaulted on a payment arrangement.
In her defense, respondent admitted the debt and conviction but pleaded financial hardship, citing a meager take-home pay supporting her family. She argued her failure to pay was not willful and that her B.P. 22 conviction, not committed in her professional capacity, did not involve moral turpitude. The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found the complaint meritorious but recommended only a thirty-day suspension for willful failure to pay just debts, not considering the B.P. 22 conviction as involving moral turpitude.

ISSUE

Whether respondent should be administratively disciplined for willful failure to pay a just debt and for her conviction of violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.

RULING

Yes. The Supreme Court modified the OCA’s recommendation and imposed a heavier penalty. The Court treated the two charges separately. First, on willful failure to pay a just debt, the Court found respondent liable. A “just debt” is a claim adjudicated by a court, which her civil liability from the B.P. 22 cases indisputably is. While sympathetic to her financial straits, the Court emphasized her moral and legal duty to settle obligations. Under the Uniform Rules, this is a light offense. As a first offense, the prescribed penalty is reprimand, which the Court imposed.
Second, and decisively, the Court ruled that conviction for B.P. 22 involves moral turpitude. Moral turpitude encompasses acts contrary to justice, honesty, or good morals. The act of issuing a worthless check involves deceit and constitutes fraud, which is inherently dishonest. This qualifies as a crime involving moral turpitude. Under the Revised Administrative Code, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for dismissal. Consequently, for this more severe offense committed in her personal capacity but reflecting on her fitness as a court employee, the Supreme Court ordered respondent’s DISMISSAL from the service. The Court also ordered her to pay her adjudged debt within ninety days.