A.M. No. MTJ-16-1879. July 24, 2018.
ANONYMOUS, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE BILL D. BUYUCAN, MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT, BAGABAG-DIADI, NUEVA VIZCAYA, RESPONDENT.

FACTS

The case originated from an anonymous complaint alleging that Judge Bill D. Buyucan had constructed a house and maintained a fighting cock farm on land not owned by him and without a building permit. The subject property was part of a 193-hectare parcel declared a permanent forest reserve under Proclamation No. 573 in 1969, later granted to the Department of Agriculture (DA) for research purposes, known as the DA-Cagayan Valley Hillyland Research Outreach Station (DA-CVHILROS). Prior to the complaint, the DA had filed several ejectment and malicious mischief cases before Judge Buyucan’s court against informal settlers, including one Eling Valdez. Judge Buyucan dismissed these cases in 2008. Subsequently, in August 2008, he acquired a portion of the very same DA property from Valdez and other settlers.
When new criminal cases were filed against other informal settlers, the Office of the Solicitor General moved for Judge Buyucan’s inhibition, arguing his residence on the disputed land compromised his impartiality. He refused to recuse himself. An investigation by the Executive Judge confirmed that Judge Buyucan was occupying approximately one hectare of the DA land, had constructed a two-storey house without a permit, and maintained a cock farm. The DENR certified no tenurial instrument was issued for the area. In his defense, Judge Buyucan claimed the land was within a DPWH road-right-of-way and that the house belonged to his nephew.

ISSUE

Whether respondent Judge Bill D. Buyucan is administratively liable for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and for violating the Code of Judicial Conduct.

RULING

Yes, the Supreme Court found Judge Buyucan guilty of Gross Misconduct and Gross Ignorance of the Law, warranting dismissal from service. The legal logic is anchored on his dual violations of substantive law and judicial ethics. First, his occupation of land clearly owned by the DA, a fact established by a presidential proclamation and tax declarations, constituted squatting on government property. His claim of occupying a DPWH road-right-of-way was unsubstantiated and legally untenable, as such areas are inalienable and not for private occupation. This demonstrated gross ignorance of property laws.
Second, and more critically, his conduct violated the Code of Judicial Conduct. By purchasing land from a party who had previously been a respondent in cases he dismissed, and then refusing to inhibit himself from subsequent related cases, he created an undeniable appearance of impropriety and bias. This eroded public confidence in judicial impartiality. A judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be so. His actions—acquiring the disputed property and then presiding over related litigation—constituted gross misconduct prejudicial to the service’s best interest. The Court emphasized that judges must adhere to the highest standards of integrity and propriety to preserve public trust. The penalty of dismissal, with forfeiture of benefits and perpetual disqualification from public office, was imposed. The Court also directed him to vacate the land and show cause why he should not be disbarred.